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Overruling McCulloch? 
Mark A. Graber 
Daniel Webster warned Whig associates in 1841 that the 
Supreme Court would likely declare unconstitutional the national 
bank bill that Henry Clay was pushing through the Congress.1 
This claim was probably based on inside information.  Webster 
was a close association of Justice Joseph Story.2  The justices at 
this time frequently leaked word to their political allies of judicial 
sentiments on the issues of the day.3  Even if Webster lacked first-
hand knowledge of how the Taney Court would probably rule in 
a case raising the constitutionality of the national bank, the 
personnel on that tribunal provided strong grounds for Whig 
pessimism.  Most Jacksonians vigorously opposed the national 
bank on both policy and constitutional grounds.4  The most 
vigorous opponents of that institution had been appointed to the 
Taney Court.  The partisan activities of these justices while on the 
bench gave little hope that Taney Court majorities would abandon 
       Regents Professor, University of Maryland School of Law.  Much thanks to David 
Schwartz and the Arkansas Law Review for their help and forbearance.  Thanks to Mark 
Killenbeck for helping me avoid many unforced errors. 
1. MERRILL D. PETERSON, THE GREAT TRIUMVIRATE: WEBSTER, CLAY, AND
CALHOUN 306-07 (1987).  See CARL BRENT SWISHER, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE UNITED STATES: VOLUME 5, THE TANEY PERIOD, 1836-64 at 29 (1974) [hereinafter 
TANEY PERIOD] (quoting Leslie Combs to Nicholas Biddle, July 27, 1835) (“Genl J. says 
the Bk is unconstitutional.  Mr. Van Buren echoes the opinion and old Tecumseh [Richard 
Johnson] follows suit.  Will the Judges—his officers, dare to decide otherwise by & bye?”). 
2. See CARL BRENT SWISHER, ROGER B. TANEY 201-02, 258-59 (Archon Books
1961) (1935) [hereinafter ROGER TANEY] (noting that Story routinely advised Webster on 
the constitutional issues of the day). 
3. See id. at 564.  The most famous leak of judicial sentiments occurred when Justice
John Catron, with the permission of Chief Justice Taney, Justice Robert Grier and Justice 
James Wayne, kept President-elect James Buchanan informed of the judicial deliberations in 
the Dred Scott case.  See Philip Auchampaugh, James Buchanan, the Court and the Dred 
Scott Case, TENN. HIST. MAG., Jan. 1926, at 231-38; TANEY PERIOD, supra note 1, at 615-
18. Taney may have privately discussed how to resolve Dred Scott with Attorney General
Caleb Cushing.  ROGER TANEY, supra note 2, at 500.  John McLean may have leaked
information about the judicial deliberations in Dred Scott to his supporters.  Id. at 489.
4. See MICHAEL F. HOLT, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN WHIG PARTY:
JACKSONIAN POLITICS AND THE ONSET OF THE CIVIL WAR 16 (1999). 
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their partisan predilections when deciding a case raising those 
constitutional questions that divided their Jacksonian sponsors 
from their Whig rivals. 
Webster’s prediction that the Supreme Court was primed to 
overrule McCulloch v. Maryland5 on the constitutionality of 
federal power to incorporate a national bank was widely shared.6  
Thomas Hart Benton praised President Andrew Jackson for 
“prepar[ing] the way for a reversal of that decision.”7  Reverdy 
Johnson, a leading Democrat and member of the Supreme Court 
bar was “convinced that the Court would declare that it would be 
unconstitutional to establish a branch [of the national] bank in a 
state that had specifically refused to sanction it.”8  Representative 
Henry Wise noted that Whigs in Congress committed to 
rechartering the national bank should consider the composition of 
the Supreme Court, and then ask, “if the distinguished gentleman 
[Taney], who removed the public deposites [sic] from the Bank 
of the United States was not at the head of it, and if a majority of 
its members, was not of that school of politicians, who believed a 
Bank of the United States to be unconstitutional?”9 
This paper explores whether Webster was right to fear a 
judicial overruling of McCulloch v. Maryland.  The bulk of the 
essay discusses the relevant political and constitutional 
commitments of the sixteen justices who sat on the Taney Court 
from 1837 until 1860.  That analysis concludes that the Supreme 
Court probably would have overruled McCulloch’s holding that 
the federal government was constitutionally authorized to 
incorporate a national bank if a proper vehicle for doing so had 
come before the court.  From 1837 until 1853, the median justice 
on the Taney Court had fought with Andrew Jackson in the bank 
wars while serving in the executive or legislative branch of the 
national government.  After 1853, at least seven justices were 
committed Jacksonians who were either on record as declaring 
the national bank unconstitutional or, where primary sources are 
not available, were regarded by their peers as persons with 
5. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
6. See Gerard N. Magliocca, “Veto! The Jacksonian Revolution in Constitutional
Law,” 78 NEB. L. REV. 205, 248-50 (1999). 
7. 13 CONG. DEB. 387 (1837). 
8. NORMAL LOISE PETERSON, THE PRESIDENCIES OF WILLIAM HENRY HARRISON
AND JOHN TYLER 70 (1989) (quoting Reverdy Johnson). 
9. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 1st Sess. 299 (1841).
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orthodox Jacksonian positions on the constitutional issues of the 
day. 
The following pages are concerned with whether in the 
proper case the Supreme Court would have overruled McCulloch 
by holding that Congress had no power to incorporate a national 
bank or no power to adopt other crucial planks of Henry Clay’s 
American System.  The American System, on which the Whig 
party campaigned for most of its history,10  was a set of proposed 
exercises of national power to stimulate commercial 
development.  Proposals included a national bank, federal internal 
improvements, protective tariffs and the distribution of federal 
surpluses from the sale of public lands to the states to enable states 
to sponsor more local commercial developments.11  The Supreme 
Court in McCulloch ruled that the federal government had power 
to incorporate a national bank.12  Immediately after handing down 
the decision, the Justice William Johnson wrote a letter to 
President Monroe—claiming to speak for all the justices on the 
Supreme Court—saying his brethren believed that the 
constitutional justification for federal power to incorporate a 
national bank also provided constitutional justification for federal 
power to sponsor internal improvements.13  The analysis below 
suggests that the Taney Court would not have been as hospitable 
to these exercises of federal power, and that the justices would 
not have sustained federal power to incorporate a national bank, 
sponsor internal improvements, or adopt related Whig policies. 
This paper does not consider whether in overruling 
McCulloch’s holding that Congress under Article I could 
incorporate a national bank, the Taney Court would also have 
overruled McCulloch’s holding that the national government had 
implied powers or that states could not interfere in any way with 
10.  See WHIG PARTY, PLATFORM OF 1852, 
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/whig-party-platform-1852 
[https://perma.cc/92AZ-RY78]; WHIG PARTY, PLATFORM OF 1844, 
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/whig-party-platform-1844 
[https://perma.cc/F3Y4-6YMJ]. 
11. See HOLT, supra note 4, at 2.
12. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
13. Whether Johnson was speaking for the entire court is doubtful.  See Mark R. 
Killenbeck, William Johnson: The Dog That Did Not Bark, 62 VAND. L. REV. 407, 441-42 
(2007). 
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federal programs.14  David Schwartz’s essay in this symposium 
makes a powerful case that Jacksonians in general and the Taney 
Court in particular adopted modified understandings of implied 
federal powers and reserved state powers that did not require a 
head-on assault on the pillars of Marshall Court jurisprudence.  
He observes, “Jacksonian legalists had a plan to undermine 
McCulloch v. Maryland without overruling it, and thereby 
maintain the prestige of a Supreme Court that would take a 
notably states’-rights turn.”15  The Taney Court, however, would 
not have had to abandon implied powers to overrule McCulloch’s 
specific holding.  A judicial decision declaring Congress had no 
power to incorporate a national bank would more likely assert that 
the national government did not have this particular implied 
power or that the bank was not sufficiently necessary to the 
exercise of the enumerated powers than denounce every sentence 
in Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion. 
The continued survival of McCulloch raises important 
questions about the nature of judicial power and constitutional 
authority.  The simple explanation for the judicial failure to 
overrule McCulloch is that no proper vehicle came before the 
Court.  Jacksonian presidents forestalled litigation by vetoing 
efforts to recharter the national bank and vetoing those internal 
improvement bills that raised similar questions of federal 
constitutional power.  A more sophisticated answer is that, in 
Jacksonian America, parties rather than courts had the final 
authority to determine the official constitutional law of the land.  
The Taney Court left McCulloch alone because the national 
executive and the national legislature during the thirty years 
before the Civil War took responsibility for resolving 
constitutional issues concerning the scope of federal power over 
national economic life. 
The conclusion briefly raises questions about constitutional 
pedagogy in times of regime change.  The fate of McCulloch 
during the three decades after Roger Brooke Taney assumed the 
Chief Justiceship illustrates how official constitutional law may 
diverge from constitutional politics on the ground.  Persons 
14. See David S. Schwartz, Defying McCulloch? Jackson’s Bank Veto Reconsidered,
72 ARK. L. REV 129, 158 (2019) (noting that “McCulloch’s doctrine extended beyond the 
Bank, to the matter of implied congressional powers in general”). 
15. Id. at 163. 
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during the 1850s training “practice-ready” constitutional lawyers  
to represent clients might have continued teaching McCulloch, 
given that decision was never officially overruled.  They might 
have better prepared students by teaching McCulloch and Taney 
Court cases that ignored McCulloch, teaching McCulloch and the 
bank veto, or just teaching the various Jacksonian vetoes of 
American System measures. Constitutional law professors in our 
time of regime change may soon be confronting analogous 
pedagogical challenges with analogous alternatives. 
I. FEDERAL POWER AND JUDICIAL
RECRUITMENT IN JACKSONIAN AMERICA 
Jacksonian Democrats after 1832 were relatively united in 
their effort to limit certain powers of the federal government.  
Many Jacksonians were nationalists on issues concerning national 
expansion and federal assistance during the rendition process for 
fugitive slaves,16 but on matters concerning federal regulation of 
the economy, antebellum Democrats almost always advanced 
narrower conceptions of federal power than their Whig rivals.  
Democratic Party Platforms from 1840 to 1856 contained the 
identical declaration that “the federal government is one of 
limited powers, derived solely from the Constitution; and the 
grants of power made therein, ought to be strictly construed by all 
the departments and agents of government; and that it is 
inexpedient and dangerous to exercise doubtful constitutional 
powers.”17  That assertion was immediately followed by nearly 
identical provisions declaring unconstitutional a national bank, 
16. See Arthur Bestor, State Sovereignty and Slavery: A Reinterpretation of
Proslavery Constitutional Doctrine, J. OF THE ILL. ST. HIST. SOC’Y, Summer 1961, at 138-
140. 
17.  DEMOCRATIC PARTY, 1856 PLATFORM, 
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/1856-democratic-party-platform 
[https://perma.cc/WF62-F7XU]; DEMOCRATIC PARTY, 1852 PLATFORM, 
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/1852-democratic-party-platform 
[https://perma.cc/4VJN-4B6C]; DEMOCRATIC PARTY, 1848 PLATFORM, 
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/1848-democratic-party-platform 
[https://perma.cc/NBZ4-Z5XJ]; DEMOCRATIC PARTY, 1844 PLATFORM, 
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/1860-democratic-party-platform 
[https://perma.cc/22QL-7EFK]; DEMOCRATIC PARTY, 1840 PLATFORM, 
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/1840-democratic-party-platform 
[https://perma.cc/E23P-3MAR]. 
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any federally sponsored internal improvements and various 
schemes to distribute to the states the proceeds from the sale of 
public lands.  The protective tariff, while not expressly declared 
unconstitutional, was claimed to be inconsistent with “justice and 
sound policy.”18  Jacksonians in 1852 and 1856 added a provision 
stating, “the democratic party will faithfully abide by and uphold 
the principles laid down in the Kentucky and Virginia resolutions 
of 1798, and in the report of Mr. Madison to the Virginia 
legislature in 1799 . . . .”19 
Jacksonian politicians made self-conscious efforts to secure 
a federal judiciary committed to this narrow conception of federal 
power.  Presidents after 1830 carefully scrutinized their judicial 
nominees to ensure fidelity to Jacksonian constitutional visions.  
In 1834, Jackson informed Martin Van Buren that only jurists 
whose “principles on the Constitution are sound, and well fixed” 
were considered for Supreme Court appointments.20  Van Buren 
in turn sought to ensure that prospective justices were 
“Democrat[s] [who] would stick to the true principles of the 
Constitution.”21  Tyler insisted that “no one should be appointed 
who was of the school of Story and Kent.”22  Concerned that 
Marshall Court justices were “broadly Federal and latitudinarian 
in all their decisions involving questions of Constitutional 
power,” Polk “resolved to appoint no man who was not an 
original Democrat and strict constitutionalist, and who would be 
less likely to relapse into the broad Federal doctrines of Judge 
Marshall and Judge Story.”23 
Jacksonians were committed to appointing justices willing 
to act on these commitments to limiting powers.  They sought 
what would later be called “judicial activists” rather than 
proponents of judicial restraint.  Before joining the bench, Many 
18. See sources cited supra note 17.
19. See sources cited supra note 17.
20. Richard P. Longaker, Andrew Jackson and the Judiciary, 71 POL. SCI. Q. 341, 358 
n.43 (1956) (quoting Andrew Jackson to Martin Van Buren, October 27, 1834).
21. ROGER TANEY, supra note 2, at 428.
22. 2 THE LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 523 (William W. Story, ed., Books
for Libraries Press: Freeport, NY, 1971) [hereinafter 2 LIFE AND LETTERS].  Millard 
Fillmore, by comparison, sought to pack the judiciary with committed Whigs.  See ROGER 
TANEY, supra note 2, at 445 (quoting Fillmore to Webster, September 10, 1851). 
23. JAMES K. POLK, POLK: THE DIARY OF A PRESIDENT 1845-1849 37 (ed. Allan
Nevins, Longmans, Green and Co.: London, 1929).  See CHARLES GROVE SELLERS, JR., 
JAMES K POLK: CONTINENTALIST 1843-46 298 (1966). 
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Taney Court justices aggressively championed the judicial power 
to declare laws unconstitutional. While on the New Hampshire 
bench in the 1810s, Levi Woodbury endorsed both judicial review 
and judicial supremacy when declaring a law unconstitutional.24  
James Wayne vigorously opposed a Georgia resolution denying 
federal judicial power to declare laws unconstitutional.25  On the 
Tennessee Supreme Court, John Catron agitated for Jacksonian 
policies from the bench and revised his own views to bring them 
in line with Jackson’s.26  Barbour when litigating Cohens v. 
Virginia insisted that the Supreme Court must protect state 
sovereignty by declaring unconstitutional overly broad federal 
laws.27  John Bannister Gibson disqualified himself for a 
Jacksonian judicial appointment in Eakin v. Raub28 by 
questioning the judicial power to declare unconstitutional the act 
of a coordinate branch of government.29 
Jacksonian executives sought to ensure reliable justices who 
would break what they perceived as a Federalist stranglehold on 
the federal judiciary by appointing veterans of the Bank War with 
close personal and partisan connections to other influential 
Jacksonian leaders to the Supreme Court.  Most Jacksonian 
judicial nominees first attracted public notice during the political 
struggles over the appropriate scope of federal power contested 
during the 1820s, 1830s and 1840s.30  Roger Taney, Levi 
Woodbury, James Wayne, Philip Pendleton Barbour, John 
McKinley, Nathan Clifford, and John Catron played prominent 
roles in Jacksonian fights against the national bank and the 
American system.  Taney and Woodbury were trusted members 
24. See Merrill v. Sherburne, 1 N.H. 199, 201-03, 210 (1818).  See also 2 LEVI 
WOODBURY, WRITINGS OF LEVI WOODBURY: POLITICAL, JUDICIAL AND LITERARY 333-34, 
344 (ed. Charles L. Woodbury, Little, Brown and Company: Boston, 1852); William D. 
Bader, Henry J. Abraham & James B. Staab, The Jurisprudence of Levi Woodbury, 18 VT. 
L. REV. 261, 274-75 (1994).
25. ALEXANDER A. LAWRENCE, JAMES MOORE WAYNE: SOUTHERN UNIONIST 26-27
(1943). 
26. See Edmund C. Gass, The Constitutional Opinions of Justice John Catron, 8 E. 
TENN. HIST. SOC’Y’S PUBLICATIONS 54, 54-55, 58 (1936). 
27.  See WILLIAM S. BELKO, PHILIP PENDLETON BARBOUR IN JACKSONIAN AMERICA:
AN OLD REPUBLICAN IN KING ANDREW’S COURT 79-82 (2016). 
28. Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle 330, 344-45 (Pa. 1825).
29.  HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF U.S.
SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH II 78 (5th ed. 2008). 
30.  For the precise details of each justice’s political activities before joining the bench,
see infra Part II. 
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of Jackson’s cabinet (McLean was appointed to the federal bench 
in part because on patronage matters he was not a trusted member 
of Jackson’s cabinet31).  Clifford was the attorney general under 
Polk.  Daniel turned down offers to join both Van Buren’s and 
Polk’s cabinets, though he remained “one of [Van Buren’s] most 
effective advisors.”32  Barbour was almost the Jacksonian 
nominee for vice president in 1832.33  Woodbury, Wayne, 
Barbour, McKinley and Clifford were Jacksonian leaders in 
Congress.  Nelson was a Jacksonian candidate for the Senate in 
New York.  Baldwin, Taney, Catron, McKinley, and Daniel 
played major roles organizing Jacksonian forces in Pennsylvania, 
Maryland, Tennessee, Alabama and Virginia respectively.34 
Supreme Court justices on the Taney Court did not abandon 
partisan activities once on the bench.  Catron remained 
particularly active in political affairs.  He helped manage James 
K. Polk’s successful presidential campaign in 1844 and served as
a trusted political advisor to Jackson, Polk and James Buchanan.35
Taney corresponded regularly with Jacksonian presidents on the
issues of the day and helped formulate Martin Van Buren’s
31. ABRAHAM, supra note 29, at 78; Swisher, ROGER TANEY, supra note 2, at 132-
33. 
32. ABRAHAM, supra note 29, at 84-85; ROGER TANEY, supra note 2, at 245. 
33. BELKO, supra note 27, at 169-74; ROGER TANEY, supra note 2, at 433.
34. ABRAHAM, supra note 29, at 79 (noting “Baldwin had been instrumental in
bringing Pennsylvania into the Jacksonian fold in the election of 1828”); Id. at 80 (noting 
Taney “served as chairman of the Jackson Central Committee of Maryland in 1828”); Id. at 
83 (crediting Catron for having “created a favorable public climate on behalf of Jacksonian 
policies” in Tennessee); Id. at 84 (“McKinley had been one of Van Buren’s key managers 
during the presidential campaign of 1836 and was personally responsible for capturing 
Alabama’s electoral votes”); Id. (Daniel “had worked hard for Jackson in the abortive 
campaign of 1824 and in the ensuing campaigns as well”). 
35. Letter from John Catron to James Polk (Aug. 27, 1839), in 5 CORRESPONDENCE
OF JAMES K. POLK, 1839-1841, 211 (Wayne Cutler ed., Vand. Univ. Press 1989); Letter 
from William Allen to James Polk (Oct. 20, 1839) in 5 CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES K. 
POLK, 1839-1841, 266 (Wayne Cutler ed., Vand. Univ. Press 1989); Letter from John Catron 
to James Polk (Nov. 19, 1839) in 5 CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES K. POLK, 1839-1841, 302 
(Wayne Cutler ed., Vand. Univ. Press 1989).  See also CHARLES GRIER SELLERS, JR., JAMES 
K. POLK: JACKSONIAN 1795-1843 322, 350-51, 384, 400, 454-55 (1957); SELLERS,
CONTINENTALIST, supra note 23, at 5, 19-20; ROGER TANEY, supra note 2, at 438; Gass, 
supra note 26, at 54-55, 58, 71.  Catron may have written the portion of President Buchanan’s
inaugural address that urged citizens to adhere to whatever ruling the Supreme Court made
on the constitutional status of slavery in the territories.  TANEY PERIOD, supra note 1, at 617, 
621.
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financial policies.36  Taney did not hide his partisan sentiments 
when congratulating Polk on the Tennessee Jacksonian leader’s 
election as president.  The Chief Justice wrote, 
I feel so truly rejoiced at your election as President of 
the U. States, that I must indulge myself in the pleasure 
of offering you my cordial congratulations.  We have 
passed through no contest for the Presidency more 
important than the one just over; nor have I seen any 
one before in which so many dangerous influences were 
combined together as were united in support of Mr. 
Clay.  Your triumphant success gives me increased 
confidence in the intelligence firmness & virtue of the 
American people; and in the safety and stability of the 
principles upon which our institutions are founded.37 
Daniel continued to advise Democratic leaders and 
conservative Virginia politicians.  He publicly supported Martin 
Van Buren’s presidential efforts in 1844.38  Taney, Grier and 
Clifford regularly informed Buchanan, his subordinates or 
political allies that the Supreme Court fully supported crucial 
administration policies.39  Grier vigorously supported the 
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, publicly attacking opponents of that 
measure.40  Story drafted Whig campaign documents and 
legislative proposals, including the prototype for the Fugitive 
36. ROGER TANEY, supra note 2, at 339-42, 344-45.  Taney served as Attorney
General form almost a year after the Senate confirmed his nomination as Chief Justice. 
During this time, he advised Jackson on constitutional issues and helped write the president’s 
farewell address.  Id. at 326-27. 
37. Letter from Roger B. Taney to James Polk in 9 CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES K.
POLK, SEPTEMBER – DECEMBER 1844, 338 (Wayne Cutler ed., Univ. of Tenn. Press 1993). 
See SWISHER, ROGER B. TANEY, supra note 3, at 435-36, 457-58, 554.  Taney may have 
privately discussed the proper ruling in Dred Scott with Attorney General Caleb Cushing. 
Taney may have also privately discussed the proper ruling in Dred Scott with Attorney 
General Caleb Cushing.  See TANEY PERIOD, supra note 1, at 620. 
38. ROGER TANEY, supra note 2, at 434-45; JOHN P. FRANK, JUSTICE DANIEL
DISSENTING: A BIOGRAPHY OF PETER V. DANIEL, 1784-1860 142 (1964).  See also ROGER 
TANEY, supra note 2 at 437-38 (discussing Daniel to Van Buren, November 19, 1844); 
TANEY PERIOD, supra note 1, at 400. 
39.  See TANEY PERIOD, supra note 1, at 645 (quoting Taney to Franklin Pierce, August
29, 1857); Id. at 732-33 (quoting Robert Grier to J.S. Black, September 15, 1859 and Nathan 
Clifford to James Buchanan, July 19, 1859). 
40. See ROGER TANEY, supra note 2, at 482.  Grier publicly sided with Attorney
General Jeremiah Black in his debate with Stephen Douglas over the proper interpretation of 
Dred Scott.  Id. 
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Slave Act of 1850.41  McLean used his judicial post as a 
springboard for his incessant campaigns for the presidency.42  
Samuel Nelson and John Campbell were seriously considered for 
the Democratic Party’s 1860 presidential nomination.43  
Woodbury probably would have been the Democratic Party 
nominee in 1852 had he not suddenly died.44  The Jay Court may 
have sworn off issuing official advisory opinions,45  but that 
precedent did not inhibit Story, Daniel and Baldwin from 
responding to a Senate request to analyze a federal bankruptcy 
law46  or Story from submitting to the full court his proposals for 
expanding federal admiralty jurisdiction.47 
The Jacksonian tendency to prefer seasoned political 
veterans for judicial vacancies provided the same benefit to 
Jacksonians and contemporary scholars: known opinions on the 
constitutional questions of the day.  Jacksonian Presidents could 
and contemporary scholars can learn what Jacksonian justices 
thought about the constitutional issues of the day by looking at 
their congressional speeches, writings when in the cabinet, 
partisan activities before joining the bench and partisan activities 
after their Supreme Court appointments.  Jacksonian executives 
had the paper trail necessary to have a high degree of confidence 
that their judicial nominees were committed to Jacksonian 
understandings of national power and the judicial function.  
Contemporary scholars who read the primary and secondary 
sources can access judicial values directly when they construct 
various models of judicial decision making rather than use 
judicial votes to establish the judicial values that explain those 
41. R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF
THE OLD REPUBLIC 376-77 (1985). 
42. For McLean’s presidential ambitions, see Paul Brickner, Reassessing Long-
Accepted Truths About Justice John McLean: His Secret of Success, 38 OHIO N. UNIV. L. 
REV. 193, 202-04 (2011); Paul Finkelman, John McLean: Moderate Abolitionist and 
Supreme Court Politician, 62 VAND. L. REV.  519, 520, 525-33 (2009). 
43. Ronald Sklut, John Archibald Campbell: A Study in Divided Loyalties, 20 ALA. 
LAW. 233, 244 (1959). 
44. TANEY PERIOD, supra note 1, at 526.  For Woodbury’s decade-long quest to
become president, see Bader, Abraham, & Staab, supra note 24, at 265-66. 
45. Letter from Justices of the Supreme Court to George Washington in 6 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, 755 
(Maeva Marcus ed., Colum. Univ. Press 1998). 
46. Taney, Thompson and McLean refrained.  See TANEY PERIOD, supra note 1, at 
432. 
47. TANEY PERIOD, supra note 1, at 432.
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votes or, almost as bad, use newspaper predictions of judicial 
votes to establish judicial values.48A judge, who when in 
Congress repeatedly declared that Congress had no power to 
incorporate a national bank, and when on the bench frequently 
engaged in political maneuvers to advance Jacksonian causes, 
was a judge a Jacksonian president could trust to vote the party 
line when there was a party line and a judge a twenty-first century 
law professor could predict in an appropriate case would reject 
McCulloch’s holding that Congress had power to incorporate a 
national bank. 
II. THE JUDGES
Sixteen justices sat on the Supreme Court from 1837 until 
1860.49  Twelve were appointed by Jacksonian Democrats, 
although Henry Baldwin and John McLean were appointed by 
Andrew Jackson before sharp partisan divisions over national 
power began structuring constitutional politics. Two, Joseph 
Story and Smith Thomson, were appointed by National 
Republicans, most of whom by 1815 had come to accept the 
constitutionality of the national bank. Samuel Nelson was 
appointed by a nominal Whig, John Tyler, whose opinions on 
national power were those of an orthodox Jacksonian.50  
Benjamin Curtis was appointed by Millard Fillmore, an orthodox 
Whig. 
The available sources are more helpful for identifying some 
judicial attitudes and some justices’ attitudes on the political 
merits and constitutional status of American system proposals 
than others.  For some justices, most notably Story and Roger 
Brooke Taney, the substantial primary and secondary sources 
provide insight into almost all details of their professional and 
private lives.  For other justices, Peter Daniel and Curtis being 
48. Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. 
Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557, 559 (1989). 
49. For the conventional history of appointments to the Taney Court, see ABRAHAM,
supra note 29, at 77-93. 
50. Frank Otto Gatell, Samuel Nelson, in 2 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 1789-1969: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS, 817, 819-22 (Leon 
Friedman & Fred L Israel eds. 1969). 
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good examples,51  the primary and secondary sources are more 
than sufficient to assess their attitudes on the political and 
constitutional merits of various American System proposals.  For 
yet other justices, John Catron and John Archibald Campbell 
being good examples,52  the primary and secondary sources, while 
providing much information, either do not address particular 
issues or are ambiguous.  In the case of Robert Grier and Samuel 
Nelson, for whom few primary and secondary sources exist, little 
more than partisanship can be determined with any confidence. 
Several rough categories of justices emerge when the 
justices on the Taney Court are rank ordered from the most 
opposed to American System proposals to the most supportive of 
such measures.  Five justices—Daniel, Barbour, Woodbury, 
Clifford, and Taney—repeatedly condemned American system 
proposals on political and constitutional grounds. Two other 
justices, Catron and Wayne, repeatedly condemned American 
system proposals, condemned some on constitutional grounds, 
participated actively in the fight against the national bank, allied 
with politicians who declared the bank unconstitutional, but never 
made an absolutely clear declaration that the Constitution forbade 
Congress from incorporating a national bank, at least in easily 
accessible primary sources.  McKinley and Campbell throughout 
most of their careers belonged to the first or second category of 
justices, but occasionally appeared open to some American 
system proposals.  Robert Grier and Samuel Nelson were 
orthodox Jacksonians who left no paper trail adequate to 
determine their specific views on the national bank or related 
proposals.  Smith Thompson left a meager paper trail, but one 
more suggestive of a Whig orientation toward the constitutional 
questions of the 1830s.  Baldwin, McLean, Curtis and Story were 
orthodox Whigs. 
The rank ordering below is more impressionistic than 
scientific.  The brief discussions use no rigid formula for 
determining the strength and scope of political and constitutional 
objections to American System proposals.  Justices who declared 
the bank unconstitutional rank as more opposed than justices who 
51. See infra notes 58-61, 152-60. The other examples are Philip Barbour, Levi
Woodbury, Nathan Clifford and John McLean.  See also infra notes 62-81, 161-68. 
52. See infra notes 87-91, 125-34. The other examples are James Wayne, John
McKinley, Smith Thompson and Henry Baldwin.  See also infra notes 92-124, 140-51. 
2019 OVERRULING MCCULLOCH? 91 
merely condemned the bank in powerful terms, even though no 
good reason exists for thinking that, say, Wayne was less opposed 
to the bank than Taney on either political or constitutional 
grounds.  The rank ordering of justices in the same category is for 
all practical purposes random.  Whether Grier or Nelson was the 
more orthodox Jacksonian is impossible to determine, as is 
determining whether Daniel or Barbour was the stricter 
constructionist. 
The following rank ordering of justices by how narrowly 
they interpreted the constitutional powers of the national 
government is also unscientific because attitudes are determined 
by off the bench behavior.  The discussion of Levi Woodbury 
concludes he was opposed to the American System because 
Woodbury gave numerous speeches that condemned American 
system proposals, he consistently voted against American System 
proposals in Congress, he helped draft Jackson’s bank veto 
message, he was a leading candidate for the Democratic 
presidential nomination in 1852, his contemporaries regarded 
Woodbury as a militant opponent of the American system and 
Woodbury’s biographers after extensively researching the 
primary documents concluded that Woodbury was an orthodox 
Jacksonian.53  The more scientific approach in orthodox political 
science determines judicial attitudes by judicial votes or 
newspaper articles predicting judicial votes.54  Jeffery Segal and 
Harold Spaeth scientifically conclude that Levi Woodbury was 
“staunchly Hamiltonian” because Woodbury frequently voted 
against state power in contract clause cases.55  The value of the 
unscientific approach taken in this paper is for readers to 
determine. 
Peter Daniel.  Justice Peter Daniel was probably the most 
militant Jacksonian on the Taney Court.  Daniel, “a major 
Jackson-Van Buren lieutenant in Virginia” before joining the 
federal bench,56  opposed virtually every proposal in the 
53. Bader, Abraham, & Staab, supra note 24, at 281.
54. See Segal & Cover, supra note 48, at 559; JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J.
SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED, 320-21 (2002). 
55. HAROLD J. SPAETH & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL 82 (1993).  For Woodbury’s tendency to reject Jacksonian orthodoxy 
on contract clause cases, see Planter’s Bank v. Sharp, 47 U.S. 301 (1848); Bader, Abraham 
& Staab, supra note 24, at 289-305. 
56. FRANK, supra note 38, at 77.
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American system and did so on constitutional grounds.  With 
reference to an unknown political actor, Daniel in 1840 declared, 
“[h]e has professed a belief in the constitutionality of a national 
bank, and that is an objection which with me would overrule any 
and every recommendation which could be urged for him or for 
any other person.”57  Daniel in 1843 informed Martin Van Buren 
that “[s]ince a protective tariff necessarily aided selective 
industries, it was a discrimination and hence unconstitutional.”58 
When President Polk vetoed on constitutional grounds an internal 
improvements bill, he received a congratulatory note from Daniel, 
urging him to stand firm against any future congressional 
legislation of that ilk.59 
Philip Pendleton Barbour.  Justice Barbour was as militant 
an opponent of federal power as Justice Daniel.  The essay on 
Barbour in the Biographical Encyclopedia of Supreme Court 
Justices describes him as being “as representative a Virginia strict 
constructionist as can be found.”60  Barbour’s recent biographer 
details “his constant and determined struggle to stem the tide of 
Clay’s so-called American System—a protective tariff, federally 
sponsored internal improvements, and a national bank.”61  When 
in Congress from 1814 to 1824 and again from 1827 to 1830, 
Barbour consistently opposed legislation broadly interpreting 
national power.62  He fought “a relentless war . . . against the 
tariff and internal improvements” during his first stint in Congress 
and, on his return to the national legislature, “fired the first salvo 
of Jackson’s forthcoming war against the Bank of the United 
States.”63  Barbour on the floor of Congress repeatedly declared 
57. FRANK, supra note 38, at 111, 113 (quoting Peter Daniel to William Brent,
February 29, 1840).  TANEY PERIOD, supra note 1, at 67; ROGER TANEY, supra note 2, at 
428-29. 
58. FRANK, supra note 38, at 164-65 (quoting Peter Daniel to Martin Van Buren, July
6, 1843). 
59. TANEY PERIOD, supra note 1, at 400 (quoting Peter Daniel to James Polk, August
5, 1846).  See FRANK, supra note 38, at 315 n.3; id. at 213 (“Daniel’s detestation of internal 
improvements financed by the Federal government was as great as his hatred of banks, and 
he could as easily claim that they were unconstitutional”). 
60. FRANK OTTO GATELL, Philip Pendleton Barbour, in 1 THE JUSTICES OF THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS, 717 
(Leon Friedman & Fred L Israel eds. 1969). 
61. BELKO, supra note 27, at 3.
62.  DANIEL FELLER, THE PUBLIC LANDS IN JACKSONIAN POLITICS 50 (1984); TANEY
PERIOD, supra note 1, at 56. 
63. BELKO, supra note 27, at 3.
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internal improvements, protective tariffs, national bankruptcy 
laws and the national bank unconstitutional.64  When challenging 
these proposals, he championed an interpretation of national 
power even narrower than what Jackson outlined in his veto 
messages.  Barbour insisted that “the framers of the Constitution 
meant to guard as carefully against the latitudinous construction 
which might be given to indefinite powers” and maintained that 
all federal measures had to have an “immediate, direct, and 
appropriate relation to the granted power.”65  When defending 
Jackson’s veto of the Maysville road bill, Barbour asserted that 
his only quarrel with administration policy was Jackson’s claim 
that the federal government could constitutionally build some 
roads.66  “We were not authorized to construct either post roads 
or military roads, or dig canals,” he at another time declared, 
“either by any power expressly granted or properly to be 
inferred.”67  Barbour frequently challenged the Marshallian 
pretensions of such cases as McCulloch.  He informed fellow 
representations that the Marshall Court had “enlarged the sphere 
of its action . . . to an indefinite extent beyond what was in the 
contemplation of those who formed it.”68 
Levi Woodbury.  Levi Woodbury was the leading New 
England opponent of the American System and the interpretation 
of federal powers that justified constitutional power to 
incorporate a national bank.  His biographer describes Woodbury 
64. See 4 REG. DEB. 1644-645 (1828); 41 ANNALS OF CONG., 1st Sess. 1679, 1918-19
(1823); 38 ANNALS OF CONG., 1st Sess. 1060-62 (1821); 35 ANNALS OF CONG., 1st Sess. 
1221, 2054-56 (1819); 30 ANNALS OF CONG., 2nd Sess. 893-99 (1816).  For Barbour’s 
political and constitutional opposition to federally sponsored internal improvements, see 6 
REG. DEB. 1143-44, 646-54 (1830); 5 REG. DEB. 251-54 (1829); 4 REG. DEB. 1513 (1827); 
41 ANNALS OF CONG., 1st Sess. 1005-13 (1823); 31 ANNALS OF CONG., 2nd Sess. 1159-64 
(1817); 30 ANNALS OF CONG., 2nd Sess. 893-98 (1816); BELKO, supra note 27, at 59-63, 
113, 132, 167-68.  For Barbour’s political and constitutional opposition to federal bankruptcy 
laws, see 38 ANNALS OF CONG., 1st Sess. 1060-72 (1821); 35 ANNALS OF CONG., 1st Sess. 
2054-55 (1819).  For Barbour’s political and constitutional opposition to the incorporation 
of the national bank, see BELKO, supra note 27, at 135-38.  See also GATELL, Phillip 
Pendleton Barbour, supra note 60, at 719, 724-25; P.P. Cynn, Philip P. Barbour, THE JOHN 
P. BRANCH HISTORICAL PAPERS OF RANDOLPH-MACON COLLEGE, 67,70, 72, 75 
(Richmond, E. Waddey Co. 1913); ROGER TANEY, supra note 2, at 172 (noting that in
Congress, Barbour “initiated one of the early skirmishes” in the Bank War).
65. 31 ANNALS OF CONG., 2nd Sess. 627, 1156 (1817) (“natural, direct, and obvious
relation”).  See BELKO, supra note 27, at 73-74. 
66. 6 REG. DEB. 1143-44 (1830).
67. 31 ANNALS OF CONG., 1st Sess. 1152 (1817).
68. 4 REG. DEB. 1645 (1827); see BELKO, supra note 27, at 84.
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as “a strict constructionist of the Constitution” who “deplored” 
McCulloch v. Maryland.69 Woodbury was a prominent 
Jacksonian leader in the House of  Representatives and then in the 
Senate, where he repeatedly condemned both the national bank 
and internal improvements on constitutional grounds.70  “[A] 
national banking corporation,” he declared, “is at all times, and in 
all forms, unconstitutional.”71  Another speech in Congress 
asserted, “the State Rights man or Democrat of 1798, who can 
swallow this new fiscal Bank as constitutional, could swallow 
both Jonah and the whale as easy as the whale did Jonah alone.”72  
Woodbury when in Jackson’s cabinet supported the presidential 
decision to veto the bill rechartering the national bank and helped 
write the veto message declaring that institution 
unconstitutional.73 
Nathan Clifford.  Nathan Clifford was a younger associate 
and near political clone of Woodbury, who Clifford regarded as 
one of “the great men of our country.”74  Both Woodbury and 
Clifford were New England Jacksonians who had extensive 
political careers before joining the bench and were committed 
throughout their political life to limiting national power.75  
Clifford first came to national attention as the author of a state 
resolution against reincorporating the national bank.76  His 
speeches in Congress repeated that position.  He was “opposed to 
a National Bank,” Clifford declared in one congressional speech, 
69. Philip D. Wheaton, Levi Woodbury: Jacksonian Financier (1955) (unpublished
Ph.D. thesis, University of Maryland).  See Bader, Abraham & Staab, supra note 24, at 261, 
261 (“Woodbury’s raison d’etre on the Court was states’ rights, as protected by a strict 
construction of constitutional powers”). 
70. See CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 1st Sess. 178, 23, 192, 260, 380 (1841); 6 REG.
DEB. 179-83 (1830).  For a brief summary of Woodbury’s political career, see Bader, 
Abraham & Staab, supra note 24, at 265-66. 
71. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 1st Sess. 180 (1841). 
72. CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 1st Sess. App. 41 (1841). 
73. For Woodbury’s role in the bank veto, see Wheaton, supra note 69, at 42-45;
ROGER TANEY, supra note 2, at 194; TANEY PERIOD, supra note 1, at 101.  For Woodbury’s 
opposition to the national bank while in Jackson’s cabinet, see Bader, Abraham & Staab, 
supra note 24, at 283-84. 
74.  PHILIP GREELY CLIFFORD, NATHAN CLIFFORD, DEMOCRAT 49-50 (G.P. Putnam’s
Sons: New York 1922). 
75. Id. at 13 (“ardent Jackson supporter”); Walter Chandler, Nathan Clifford: A
Triumph of Untiring Effort, 11 AM. BAR ASS’N J. 57, 57 (1925). 
76. CONG. GLOBE, 23d Cong., 1st Sess. 148 (1833). 
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“believing it to be both unconstitutional and inexpedient.”77  
Clifford in other legislative speeches asserted that internal 
improvements, protective tariffs and efforts to give the states the 
proceeds from the sale of public lands were unconstitutional.78  
While a member of Polk’s cabinet, he helped write presidential 
veto messages declaring unconstitutional internal improvements 
bills.79 
Roger Brooke Taney.  Roger Brooke Taney may have been 
the most orthodox of the Jacksonians on the Taney Court.  Daniel 
Feller notes that Taney “stood closer to the ideological heart of 
Jacksonianism than anyone save Jackson himself.”80  Taney 
helped led the fight against the national bank in Jackson’s cabinet.  
Taney was the first member of the cabinet to claim the bank was 
unconstitutional, he wrote a memo to Jackson urging him to veto 
on numerous constitutional grounds the bill rechartering the bank, 
he helped draft the passages in Jackson’s veto message that 
declared the bank neither constitutionally necessary nor 
constitutionally proper and he was the only  member of Jackson’s 
cabinet who consistently supported Jackson’s effort to remove 
federal deposits from the national bank.81  “The overthrow of The 
Monster,” Taney later wrote, “was the greatest of all the great 
public services of Genl. Jackson.”82  Taney opposed on 
constitutional grounds other proposed Whig exercises of national 
power, most notably bills distributing surplus federal revenue to 
the states.  He informed President Jackson, “the revenue which 
this government is authorized to raise was intended to be used for 
national purposes only, and whenever it shall exceed what may 
77. CONG. GLOBE, 26th Cong., 1st Sess. App. 475 (1840). 
78. See CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 1st Sess. 92, 96, 127-30 (1841); CONG. GLOBE,
26th Cong., 1st Sess. App. 475 (1840).  See also CLIFFORD, supra note 74, at 109, 115-17, 
126-128. 
79. PAUL H. BERGERON, THE PRESIDENCY OF JAMES K. POLK 197 (University Press
of Kansas 1987). 
80.  DANIEL FELLER, THE JACKSONIAN PROMISE, AMERICA, 1815-1840 176 (The John
Hopkins University Press 1995). 
81. For Taney’s participation in the Bank Wars, see ROGER TANEY, supra note 2, at 
176-77, 180-81, 189-95, 218-19, 228, 230-32, 258, 333-334.  See also CHARLES WARREN, 
THE SUPREME COURT IN THE UNITED STATES HISTORY 100-05 (Little, Brown, and 
Company 1918); TANEY PERIOD, supra note 1, at 20. 
82. TANEY PERIOD, supra note 2, at 127 (quoting Taney to Ellis Lewis, October 25,
1845).  Taney let Jackson know that he approved when President John Tyler vetoed a 
national bank bill.  ROGER TANEY, supra note 2, at 345 (quoting Taney to Jackson, 
September 30, 1841). 
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be usefully and constitutionally employed in the exercise of its 
legitimate duties it is bound to reduce it.”83  Taney broke from 
more southern justices, Daniel and Barbour in particular, only in 
his support for protective tariffs.84 
John Catron.  John Catron was a prominent political leader 
who did not cease his Jacksonian political maneuvers when on the 
bench.  He was a “longtime personal and political friend” of 
Andrew Jackson and a self-described “enem[y] of the U.S. 
Bank.”85  During the bank wars, Catron organized support for 
Jackson administration policy and wrote several articles for the 
Knoxville Examiner condemning that institution.86  Immediately 
before being appointed to the Supreme Court, Catron urged 
Jackson not to be distracted from the “battle against thirty-five 
millions of money [the Bank of the United States], against 
uncompromising nullification, against a scheme of protection, 
and of its correlative, waste by internal improvements.”87  Catron 
retained his Jacksonian connections while on the federal bench.  
He corresponded regularly with Presidents Jackson, Polk and 
Buchanan.  He managed Martin Van Buren’s presidential 
campaign in Tennessee and was one of Polk’s main campaign 
advisors.88  Austin Allen, the author of a rare analysis of Catron’s 
83. ROGER TANEY, supra note 2, at 329-331.  Taney endorsed Jackson’s decision to
sign a distribution bill that merely deposited federal surpluses with state governments.  He 
made clear, however, that the federal government could not give such moneys to the states. 
He told Jackson that if Jacksonians in the federal government did “not bring [the deposited 
funds] back from the states, they will be compelled to sanction a principle, which is directly 
at war with that construction of the federal Constitution for which they have been so long 
contending.”  Id. at 329-331. 
84. ROGER TANEY, supra note 2, at 155.
85. ABRAHAM, supra note 29, at 84; Walter Chandler, The Centenary of Associate
Justice John Catron of the United States Supreme Court (June 11, 1937) (quoting John Catron 
to Andrew Jackson, February 5, 1838).  See JOSHUA W. CALDWELL, SKETCHES OF THE 
BENCH AND BAR OF TENNESSEE 87 (1898).  (“[f]or many years [Catron] had been one of 
Jackson’s most ardent admirers and most efficient supporters”); GATELL, Phillip Pendleton 
Barbour, supra note 60, at 738, 748-49 (describing Catron as “one of the leading Jackson 
men”). 
86. TIMOTHY S. HUEBNER, THE SOUTHERN JUDICIAL TRADITION STATES JUDGES
AND SECTIONAL DISTINCTIVENESS, 1790-1890 51-52 (1999); GATELL, Phillip Pendleton 
Barbour, supra note 60, at 739-40; Chandler, supra note 85, at 15; see DONALD MALCOM 
ROPER, MR. JUSTICE THOMPSON AND THE CONSTITUTION 108 (1987); SELLERS, 
JACKSONIAN, supra note 35, at 174-75; Gass, supra note 26, at 54-55; TANEY PERIOD, supra 
note 1, at 60, 113. 
87. GATELL, Phillip Pendleton Barbour, supra note 60, at 743, 745.
88. GATELL, Phillip Pendleton Barbour, supra note 60, at 743, 745; ROPER, supra 
note 86, at 108. 
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judicial opinions concludes that the Tennessee jurist was devoted 
to “Jacksonian jurisprudence” and “articulat[ed] a set of 
jurisprudential assumptions quite similar to Taney’s . . . .”89  
Catron is ranked below Taney only because, although he devoted 
his political life to orthodox Jacksonian causes and condemned 
American system proposals in strong terms, no easily accessible 
surviving records exists of Catron declaring specifically that 
Congress had no constitutional power to incorporate a national 
bank or finance internal improvements in the states. 
James Wayne.  Justice Wayne’s political opinions are easy 
to discern though they were less often expressed in constitutional 
terms than were those articulated by Barbour, Daniel and 
Woodbury.  While a Jacksonian member of Congress 
representing Georgia during the 1820s, Wayne led the fight 
against Whig efforts to recharter the national bank.  Thomas Hart 
Benton, the Jacksonian leader of the Missouri delegation, 
regarded Wayne as “among the ten zealous, able, determined” 
members of the House who support Jackson administration 
banking policies.90  Wayne praised Jackson’s veto of the 
Maysville Road Bill and declared that Congress had no 
constitutional power to pass protective tariffs.91  Wayne’s 
biographer, Alexander Lawrence, concludes that “Wayne had no 
trouble in subscribing to his party’s platform, which was 
distinctly Jacksonian in tone.  It opposed the Bank of the United 
States, the principle of the protective tariff, and Internal 
Improvements by the general government.”92  Lawrence is 
confident that Wayne would have declared internal improvements 
unconstitutional had a proper case come before the court.93 
Although Wayne explicitly declared unconstitutional protective 
tariffs and federally sponsored internal improvements, his 
89.  Austin Allen, Jacksonian Jurisprudence and the Obscurity of Justice John Catron,
62 VAND. L. REV. 491, 493, 517 (2009).  See HUEBNER, supra note 86, at 41 (“thorough[ly] 
[devoted] to Jacksonian principles”). 
90. ALEXANDER A. LAWRENCE, JAMES MOORE WAYNE: SOUTHERN UNIONIST 71-74
(1943) (quoting Benton).  See 10 REG. DEB. 350 (1834); 9 REG. DEB. 2132 (1832); 8 REG. 
DEB. 351-353 (1831); GATELL, Phillip Pendleton Barbour, supra note 60, at 604; TANEY 
PERIOD, supra note 1, at 25-26, 54. 
91. 8 REG. DEB. 390 (1831); 6 REG. DEB. 1147-48 (1830); see also LAWRENCE, supra
note 90, at 40, 101-02; 10 REG. DEB. 461 (1834). 
92. LAWRENCE, supra note 90, at 75; GATELL, Phillip Pendleton Barbour, supra note
60, at 604. 
93. LAWRENCE, supra note 90, at 102.
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congressional speeches condemning the Bank of the United States 
did not as explicitly address constitutional issues.  Still, Wayne 
interpreted federal powers quite narrowly.  His speeches called 
for “a limitation of the action of the Government to the text of the 
constitution” and rejected “the employment of all means, which 
are not essential to the execution of a substantively granted 
power.”94  These statements are inconsistent with central planks 
of McCulloch and Marshallian jurisprudence.  Wayne in 1854 
claimed he gave national powers “a rational and limited 
interpretation” as opposed to those “whose tendency has been to 
give [the national government] legislative ability in cases where 
the power has not been delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, or when powers have been asserted by the 
Legislation of this United States, which were reserved to the 
States respectively or the people.”95 
Wayne exhibited stronger nationalist strains when on the 
bench than such stalwart state rights activists as Daniel, Barbour 
and Taney.  He was more inclined to expand federal jurisdiction 
and insist on the exclusivity of the federal commerce power than 
some Jacksonian judicial appointees on the Taney Court.96  Curtis 
on the basis of these votes declared that Wayne and McLean were 
the “most high-toned Federalists on the bench.”97  Wayne 
exhibited similar nationalist strains in Congress.  He supported all 
military appropriations, opposed nullification and was the only 
member of the Georgia congressional delegation who vote for 
Jackson’s Force Bill, a measure that substantially increased the 
scope of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction.98 
94. 6 REG. DEB. 701 (1830); James M. Wayne, Address, Thirty-Seventh Annual
Report of the American Colonization Society 40 (C. Alexander, Printer: Washington, DC, 
1854); see LAWRENCE, supra note 90, at 40, 111. 
95. Wayne, supra note 94, at 41.
96. See LAWRENCE, supra note 90, at viii (describing Wayne as “a Georgian who
made love of the Federal Union the governing principle of his political and judicial career”).  
97.  GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, 1 MEMOIR OF BENJAMIN ROBBINS CURTIS, L.L.D. 168
(Benjamin R. Curtis ed., Little, Brown, and Company 1879) (quoting Benjamin Robbins 
Curtis to Mr. Ticknor, February 29, 1852).  See Lawrence, supra note 90, at 93-94; SPAETH 
& SEGAL, supra note 55, at 82 (describing Wayne as “staunchly Hamiltonian”). 
98. LAWRENCE, supra note 90, at 55, 63-65; see FRANK OTTO GATELL, James M.
Wayne, in 1 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969: THEIR 
LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS, 603-04 (Leon Friedman & Fred L Israel eds. 1969).  Wayne 
also strongly supported Jacksonian efforts to remove the Cherokees from Georgia.  See 
LAWRENCE, supra note 90, at 62. 
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These nationalistic sentiments are consistent with important 
strains of Jacksonian Democracy.  Jacksonians supported 
expanding the federal court system once the federal courts were 
staffed with Jacksonians likely to be more pro-slavery than state 
court justices in free jurisdictions.99 Jackson vehemently opposed 
nullification and appointed to the Supreme Court only politicians 
who supported his position in the Nullification Crisis.100  
Jacksonians as a whole had no consensual understanding of 
whether federal commerce power was exclusive.  They were 
united on a narrow interpretation of federal power, but not on 
whether states had concurrent power on those matters on which 
the Constitution authorized federal regulation.101  Wayne 
articulated the more nationalistic strand of Jacksonianism that 
combined strict construction of national power with sharp limits 
on state power to regulate the limited subjects constitutionally 
entrusted to the federal government.  Wayne’s opinions in slavery 
cases illustrate this understanding of national power and 
federalism.  He agreed with Story in Prigg v. Pennsylvania that 
federal power over the rendition process was exclusive.102  He 
agreed with Taney in Dred Scott v. Sandford that Congress had 
no power to ban slavery in American territories.103  Curtis may 
have initially associated Wayne with McLean’s Whiggish 
nationalism but McLean who was more familiar with Wayne 
knew otherwise.  During the early 1840s, McLean complained 
that Wayne, Catron, Daniel and Thompson had formed a judicial 
alliance against the proto-Whig nationalists on the Court.104 
John McKinley.  Justice John McKinley was another of the 
many Jacksonian judicial appointees who had previously 
distinguished themselves in congressional fights against the 
national bank.  McKinley began his career as a Federalist and 
99. See Mark A. Graber, James Buchanan as Savior? Judicial Power, Political
Fragmentation, and the Failed 1831 Repeal of Section 25, 88 OR. L. REV. 95, 126-32 (2009). 
100. See ABRAHAM, supra note 29, at 80, 83-84. 
101. See, e.g., The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 283 (1849).
102. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 636 (1842) (Wayne, J., concurring).
103.  Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 454 (1856) (Wayne, J., concurring).  Wayne
was the moving force behind the judicial decision to declare that Congress could not ban 
slavery in the territories rather than, as the Taney Court had originally decided, to resolve 
Dred Scott strictly on conflict of laws principles.  See LAWRENCE, supra note 90, at 147-49; 
CURTIS, 1 CURTIS, supra note 97, at 206-07, 234-36; ROGER TANEY, supra note 2, at 487-
98. 
104. See FRANK, supra note 38, at 171-72.
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National Republican,105 but joined the Jacksonian forces by 
1826.106  “Once he converted to Jacksonianism,” his biographer 
declares, McKinley “remained true to its basic tenets, both on and 
off the bench, until his death.”107  Some contemporaries 
questioned whether his initial conversion was sincere,108  but by 
the time Jackson assumed the presidency McKinley had 
established his strict constructionist bona fides.  McKinley was 
the acknowledged leader of Jacksonian forces in Alabama and a 
close associate of James K. Polk, then the Jacksonian speaker of 
the House.109  He actively participated in the fight against the 
national bank in the Alabama legislature, where he wrote a 
petition declaring the bank “inconsistent with our free 
institutions,” and “dangerous to the peace and safety of the 
union.”  McKinley in Congress strongly supported Jackson’s 
effort to remove government deposits from Biddle’s 
institution.110  McKinley was one of five representatives selected 
when Jacksonians in the House of Representatives sought to pack 
the Ways and Means committee with opponents of the national 
bank.111  Without mentioning McCulloch by name, McKinley 
condemned Marshall Court decisions by which “the powers of the 
Federal Government are, by mere construction, made to 
overshadow State powers, and render them almost 
contemptible.”112  He insisted that the national government 
exercise only those powers “expressly granted by the 
Constitution.”113 
105. See STEVEN P. BROWN, JOHN MCKINLEY AND THE ANTEBELLUM SUPREME 
COURT: CIRCUIT RIDING IN THE OLD SOUTHWEST 20, 27 (2012). 
106. Id. at 44, 79; FRANK OTTO GATELL, John McKinley, in 1 THE JUSTICES OF THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS, 769-71 
(Leon Friedman & Fred L Israel eds. 1969); Jimmie Hicks, Associate Justice John McKinley, 
A Sketch, 18 ALA. REV. 227, 238-31 (1965). 
107. BROWN, supra note 105, at 6.
108. See John M. Martin, John McKinley: Jacksonian Phase, 28 ALA. HIST. Q. 7, 7 
(1966). 
109. BROWN, supra note 105, at 103; SELLERS, JACKSONIAN, supra note 35, at 213.
110. Martin, supra note 108, at 27; GATELL, John McKinley, supra note 106, at 772-
73. 
111. BROWN, supra note 105, at 97.
112. Martin, supra note 108, at 9.
113. Martin, supra note 108, at 21 (quoting McKinley); GATELL, John McKinley,
supra note 106, at 770.  George Whatley claims that McKinley endorsed “[t]he compact 
theory of government” as was “a true disciple of Thomas Jefferson wrote in the Kentucky 
Resolution, and of the basic political philosophies of John C. Calhoun.”  George C. Whatley, 
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McKinley’s record on internal improvements and other 
exercises of federal power is less clear than his vigorous 
opposition to the national bank.  McKinley occasionally spoke 
out against federal internal improvements programs, once 
describing the system as “unjust and partial.”114  Throughout his 
career, McKinley insisted that the federal government turn over 
control of public lands not being used for forts upon statehood.  
He maintained, “the United States cannot hold land in any State 
of the Union, except for the purposes enumerated in the 
Constitution.”115  McKinley at other times supported American 
system proposals.  McKinley voted for the Maysville Road Bill, 
which ran through his home town.116  He vigorously urged the 
federal government to give the proceeds of the sale of public lands 
to the states.117 
These apparent heresies justify ranking McKinley slightly 
below Catron and Wayne, but they are not suggestive of 
substantial deviation from Jacksonian constitutional principles.  
Many Jacksonians during the early 1830s approved some internal 
improvement projects. Such stalwart Jacksonians as Thomas Hart 
Benton voted with McKinley for the Maysville Road Bill.118 
Jackson approved several internal improvements projects.119 
Jacksonians united against almost all internal improvements 
projects only over time. McKinley was a faithful Jacksonian 
during the 1830s because he rejected national power on all 
matters that the Jacksonian catechism at that particular time 
mandated rejecting national power.  Contemporaries regarded 
him as an “orthodox, administration Democrat.”120  Neither 
Jackson nor Polk doubted McKinley’s credentials as a strict 
constructionist.121  In 1836, the year before his judicial 
Justice John McKinley, 4 BULLETIN OF THE NORTH ALABAMA HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION 
15, 17-18 (1959). 
114. CONG. GLOBE., 23rd Cong. 1st Sess., 429 (1834).
115. 4 REG. DEB. 508 (1928); see BROWN, supra note 105, at 84.
116. BROWN, supra note 105, at 85.
117. 6 REG. DEB. 302, 340 (1830); 4 REG. DEB. 453-54 (1828); see Hicks, supra note
106, at 229; GATELL, John McKinley, supra note 106, at 772; BROWN, supra note 105, at 
85.  McKinley insisted he supported the Maysville road under instructions from the Alabama
legislature.  Martin, supra note 108, at 17-18, 21.
118. See DONALD B. COLE, THE PRESIDENCY OF ANDREW JACKSON 64 (1993)
119. See id. at 66, 108-09. 
120. GATELL, John McKinley, supra note 106, at 773.
121. See ABRAHAM, supra note 29, at 84; BROWN, supra note 105, at 106.
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appointment, McKinley successfully campaigned for the Senate 
on a platform of constitutional opposition to the national bank, 
protective tariffs and internal improvements.122 
John Archibald Campbell.  Justice John Campbell was a 
public opponent of the national bank, internal improvements and 
related exercises of national power, but he may have had some 
private Whig sympathies. During the 1830s, Campbell identified 
with the Jacksonian coalition in Alabama that supported 
Jackson’s veto of the Maysville road and his veto of the bill 
rechartering the national bank.123  Robert Saunders’s recent 
biography of Campbell maintains that Campbell early 
Democratic allegiance was a facade made necessary by Jackson’s 
overwhelming popularity.  The future justice during the bank 
wars, Saunders insists, secretly maintained an “all-but-Whig 
ideology.”124  Campbell’s behavior during the 1836 Alabama 
Senate election provides some evidence that his public persona 
and private sentiments diverged.  While publicly endorsing John 
McKinley, the Jacksonian candidate, Campbell informed 
intimates that he “infinitely prefer[ed] the alternative,” a 
candidate on record as supporting “the constitutionality of tariff 
laws, of internal improvements, and [of] the incorporation of a 
national bank.”125  Campbell quickly added, however, that his 
preferred candidate, Arthur Francis Hopkins, “disclaims all idea 
of aiding in any & abhors the policy of each.”126  Moreover, his 
criticisms of John McKinley were personal rather than political.  
While Saunders interprets these sentiments as demonstrating that 
Campbell thought American System proposals constitutional,127  
the better interpretation may be that Campbell was willing to vote 
for a candidate who thought American System proposals 
impolitic only rather than a candidate he regarded as a 
demagogue. 
122. See ROBERT SAUNDERS, JR., JOHN ARCHIBALD CAMPBELL: SOUTHERN
MODERATE, 1811-1889, at 31 (1997). 
123. See Christine Jordan, The Last of the Jacksonians, in SUPREME COURT 
HISTORICAL SOCIETY, YEARBOOK 1980, at 80 (1980); SAUNDERS, supra note 122, at 30. 
124. SAUNDERS, supra note 122, at 55-56; see also id. at 39, 69.
125. SAUNDERS, supra note 122, at 31. 
126. Campbell to Henry Goldwaithe, November 29, 1836, Campbell Family Papers,
#135, Fol. 3, Southern Historical Collection, Library of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; 
SAUNDERS, supra note 122, at 31. 
127. SAUNDERS, supra note 122, at 31.
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Campbell’s beliefs about the political and constitutional 
merits of the national bank and related measures are as uncertain 
at the time he was appointed to the Supreme Court.  Saunders 
claims that Campbell by 1850 had “reassessed what he perceived 
as the fundamental meaning of the Constitution”128  and had 
developed an “increasingly inflexible states’ rights 
philosophy.”129  The New York Tribune when Campbell was 
nominated declared him “about the ablest man connected with the 
ultra State-Rights organization . . . filled with all the dogmas and 
mad metaphysics of Mr. Calhoun.”130  Still, Campbell’s precise 
opinions on federal power in matter unrelated to slavery cannot 
be identified with any degree of certainty at the time he was 
nominated to the federal bench.  Campbell’s nomination was 
strongly supported by state’s rights advocates, but whether that 
support transcended slavery issues is unclear.  He made few easily 
accessible declarations on American system proposals and those 
he made are ambiguous.  Campbell when opposing secession 
pointed out that federal law “has been purged of every law of 
which the Southern States [have] complained: the Tariff Act for 
protection; the Act for the Bank of the United States . . . .”131  This 
passage appears to indicate that Campbell was opposed to federal 
power to incorporate a bank and impose protective tariffs, but 
Campbell nowhere specifically indicates whether he shared the 
southern aversion to these measures.132   
Robert Grier.  Justice Grier’s opinions on the questions of 
national power that arose in Jacksonian America are hard to 
discern.  Unlike most other Jacksonian jurists, he was not 
conspicuously involved in public affairs before joining the bench.  
The sparse secondary literature indicates that Grier was a life-
long Democrat who owed his appointments to the state and 
federal bench to his partisan affiliation.  The Governor of 
128. SAUNDERS, supra note 122, at 83.
129. SAUNDERS, supra note 122, at 115; see also id. at 68, 87, 93.
130. CHARLES WARREN, 2 THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 246 
(Little, Brown and Company 1926). 
131. SAUNDERS, supra note 122, at 138 (quoting Campbell to Daniel Chandler,
November 12, 1860). 
132. Campbell’s postwar statements are as ambiguous on national power.  He called
for a strict construction of federal power but did so when objecting to Reconstruction 
legislation mandating racial equality rather than federal laws regulating commercial life in 
the states.  See id. at 226-27. 
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Pennsylvania, when recommending Grier to President Polk, 
claimed that Grier was “a sincere, and steadfast advocate” of 
“[t]he rights guaranteed by the Constitution to the states—the 
republican doctrine of state rights—opposition to a national 
bank—all the cardinal principles of the democratic party.”133  
Several commentaries on his appointment suggest that Grier’s 
views were “orthodox” and that his appointment was favored by 
the Calhoun wing of the Democratic party.134  Unfortunately, no 
easily accessible record exists of a speech Grier gave or a letter 
he wrote confirming his opposition to the national bank and 
commitment to other planks of the Jacksonian constitutional 
vision. 
Samuel Nelson.  Justice Nelson left almost as tiny a paper 
trail as Robert Grier.  He was deeply involved in both local and 
national Democratic politics.  Nelson had close affiliations with 
the Van Buren wing of the New York Democrats, was their 
unsuccessful nominee for the Senate in 1844 and was apparently 
given some consideration for the Democratic presidential 
nomination.135  Edward Countryman’s biographical essay asserts 
that Nelson while on the bench maintained “a deep interest in 
public affairs and entertained decided opinions upon all questions 
of National policy,” but Countryman does not reveal what those 
opinions were.136  Given Nelson’s involvement with the Van 
Buren wing of the Democratic party and his nomination for 
Senate in 1844, a strong inference can be made that he thought 
the national bank and most internal improvements 
133. TANEY PERIOD, supra note 1, at 232.
134. See Daniel J. Curran, Polk, Politics, and Patronage: The Rejection of George W.
Woodward’s Nomination to the Supreme Court, 121 PA. MAG. OF HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 163, 
198 n.140 (1997); EUGENE IRVING MCCORMACK, JAMES K. POLK: A POLITICAL 
BIOGRAPHY TO THE PRELUDE OF WAR 1795-1845 339 (New York 1965). 
135. See Edwin Countryman, Samuel Nelson, 19 THE GREEN BAG 329 (1907);
Richard H. Leach, The Rediscovery of Samuel Nelson, 34 N.Y. HIST. 64, 65 (1953) (“there 
is reason to believe he was not without political influence in the Democratic Party as well.”); 
FRANK OTTO GATELL, Samuel Nelson, in 2 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME 
COURT: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 825 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., 
Chelsea House Publishers: New York 1980) (noting that Nelson was “seriously mentioned 
as a possible Democratic candidate for President” in 1860). 
136. See Countryman, supra note 135, at 333.
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unconstitutional, but that inference is not supported by easily 
accessible primary sources.137 
Smith Thompson.  Justice Thompson’s opinions on the 
issues dividing Whigs from Jacksonians are difficult to discern 
with complete confidence, but he left more of a paper trail than 
either Grier or Nelson. Thompson’s first political associations 
were with leading New York anti-Federalists.  He formed a 
political alliance with Martin Van Buren early in both of their 
careers.  Thompson was also a protegee of the conservative jurist 
James Kent, he strongly identified with the more moderate wing 
of New York Republicans during the 1810s, and he supported 
John Quincy Adams rather than Jackson during the 1828 
presidential election.138  Thompson when a judge in New York 
strongly supported banks incorporated by the states,139  but the 
issue that divided Jacksonians from Whigs concerned the political 
and constitutional status of a national bank, not banks per se.  
Unfortunately, as Thompson’s biographer acknowledges, on 
questions concerning, “Hamiltonian programs,” “Thompson’s 
views . . . were not specifically recorded.”140  Thompson 
concurred in a judicial decision condemning state power to 
interfere with the national bank his first year on the federal bench, 
but he had suggested a narrower conception of federal power 
while on the New York bench.  He later reaffirmed that narrow 
conception of federal power in his dissenting opinion in Brown v. 
Maryland.141  John Quincy Adams nevertheless thought that 
137. Nelson when on the New York bench supported state charted banks and state
financed internal improvements.  See GATELL, Nelson, supra note 135, at 819-22.  Such 
support was consistent with Jacksonian commitment to state powers. 
138. For Thompson’s conflicting and changing political alliances, see ROPER, supra
note 86, at 1, 3, 10-14; GERALD T. DUNNE, Smith Thompson, in 1 THE JUSTICES OF THE 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 475-78, 485 (Leon 
Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., Chelsea House Publishers: New York 1980). 
139. ROPER, supra note 86, at 13-14. 
140. Id. at 35.  Roper finds “a similarity in the patterns of Thompson’s and Kent’s
economic thought.”  Id.  Joseph Story in 1807, before his Whig views became clearly 
pronounced, thought Thompson had “the reputation of industry and soundness.”  1 THE LIFE 
AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 145 (William W. Story, ed., Books for Libraries Press: 
Freeport, NY, 1971) [hereinafter 1 LIFE AND LETTERS] (quoting Joseph Story to Samuel P.P. 
Fay, May 18, 1807). 
141. Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. 419, 449-59 (1827); see also ROPER, supra note 86, 
at 142. 
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Thompson was a friend of the national bank.142  Perhaps the best 
that can be said of this sparse record is that Thompson probably 
would have sustained McCulloch, given his penchant for stare 
decisis,143  but might have joined a judicial majority declaring 
some internal improvements unconstitutional.  Donald Roper 
accurately sums up the available evidence when he declares, 
“[w]hat Thompson would have done had he been faced with 
positive Congressional legislation is so far removed from the 
actual facts that it is hardly worth conjecture.  For what it is worth, 
however, he probably would have upheld such laws.”144 
Henry Baldwin.  Justice Baldwin in sane moments was 
nearly certain to support federal power, though those moments 
became rarer during his tenure on the Supreme Court.145  Baldwin 
in Congress was a leading proponents of internal improvements 
and protective tariffs.146  Carl Swisher describes him as “a 
fanatical friend of the Bank.”147  Baldwin publicly opposed 
Jackson’s attempt to destroy the national bank, urged Taney to 
halt the administration’s attack on that institution, and joined the 
Whig opposition once opposition to Jackson organized.148  Story, 
a reliable authority on Whig orthodoxy, thought “quite well of the 
[Baldwin] appointment.”149  Baldwin’s later years were marked 
by mental illness, but when healthy he was a reliable supporter of 
national power. 
142. See 8 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 304 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 
1876); TANEY PERIOD, supra note 1, at 45. 
143. See ROPER, supra note 86, at 54; DUNNE, supra note 138, at 484.
144. ROPER, supra note 86, at 296.
145. Flavia M. Taylor, The Political and Civic Career of Henry Baldwin, 1799-1830,
24 W. PA. HIST. MAG. 45-49 (1941). 
146. Id. at 37, 45-49; FRANK OTTO GATELL, Henry Baldwin, in 1 THE JUSTICES OF 
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 573-75 (Leon 
Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., Chelsea House Publishers: New York 1980). 
147. ROGER TANEY, supra note 2, at 181, 211, 311.
148. GATELL, Baldwin, supra note 146, at 576-77; ABRAHAM, supra note 29, at 79-
80. 
149. 2 LIFE AND LETTERS, supra note 22, at 35 (quoting Joseph Story to Sarah Waldo
Story).  Daniel Webster was similarly pleased.  See TANEY PERIOD, supra note 1, at 49.  
While on the court, Baldwin penned a monograph sharply criticizing the views Story 
advocated in his Commentaries on the Constitution.  Baldwin focused, however, on Story’s 
discussion of state laws.  His text did not discuss the constitutional status of federal power.  
See HENRY BALDWIN, A GENERAL VIEW OF THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE 
CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES (Da Capo Press: New York 
1970).  No evidence exists that Baldwin while on the Court modified the views he expressed 
in Congress on the national bank internal improvements or the tariff. 
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Benjamin Curtis. Justice Curtis identified with 
conservative Whigs throughout his political career.150  He 
“always voted . . . for the candidates of the Whig party while that 
organization continued to exist.”151  Specific records of his 
attitude toward the national bank do not seem to have survived,152  
in part because Curtis came to prominence after the bank wars 
had simmered down.  Nevertheless, Curtis was a strong supporter 
of Daniel Webster, a prominent bank advocate.  Curtis praised 
Webster for “the just and sound principles which you have always 
held and enforced on [the maintenance of a safe currency],” 
which is probably a reference to Webster’s support of the national 
bank, and for being “a steady and powerful friend” of “the internal 
improvements of the whole United States.”153  Curtis’s analysis 
of the territorial clause in his dissenting opinion in Dred Scott 
echoed Marshall’s interpretation of the necessary and proper 
clause in McCulloch.  “Whether a particular rule or regulation be 
needful,” the Massachusetts jurist wrote, “must be finally 
determined by Congress.”154  Before joining the bench, Curtis 
asserted that “[t]he question whether the Constitution of the 
United States gives the power to construct roads [] is an open and 
difficult one.”155  Nevertheless, nothing in his antebellum record 
supports an inference that Curtis would have declared 
150. See STUART STREICHLER, JUSTICE CURTIS IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA: AT THE
CROSSROADS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 3, 9 (2005) (stating that he was “a leading 
spokesman for the Whigs of Massachusetts” and “[h]is constitutional thought . . . was rooted 
most of all in what might be called the Whig tradition”). 
151. CURTIS, 1 CURTIS supra note 97, at 150; see also id. at 114, 134, 180 (noting that
Justice John McLean “would be a good President”). 
152. After the Civil War, Curtis gave a speech implying that the national government
had the power to incorporate a bank.  GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, 2 MEMOIR OF BENJAMIN 
ROBBINS CURTIS, L.L.D. 366 (Benjamin R. Curtis ed., Little, Brown, and Company: Boston 
1879) [hereinafter CURTIS, 2 CURTIS]. 
153. CURTIS, 1 CURTIS, supra note 97, at 115; see also id. at 73, 75, 463-66.  Webster
returned the favor by promoting Curtis when Whig presidents had the opportunity to appoint 
a Supreme Court justice.  Id. at 154; see STREICHLER, supra note 150, at 37; ABRAHAM, 
supra note 29, at 88-89 (noting Curtis’s sterling Whig credentials). 
154. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 614-15 (1856) (Curtis, J., dissenting).
Compare McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819) (“the sound construction of the 
constitution must allow to the national legislature that discretion, with respect to the means 
by which the powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which will enable that body 
to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the manner most beneficial to the people”).  See 
STREICHLER, supra note 150, at 141 (noting the parallels between the Curtis dissent in Dred 
Scott and the Marshall opinion in McCulloch). 
155. CURTIS, 2 CURTIS, supra note 152, at 116.
108 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  72:1 
unconstitutional proposed Whig exercises of national power and 
much indicates that he would have sustained such measures. 
Curtis’s behavior during the Civil War was consistent with 
his conservative Whig ideology, even as he broke with the 
Republican Party.  Curtis strongly opposed the policies Lincoln 
adopted to fight the Civil War, most notably the emancipation 
proclamation and the suspension of habeas corpus.156  These were 
issues of presidential power.  Conservative Whigs who 
championed broad federal power had nevertheless historically 
been opposed to unilateral executive power when exercised by 
Andrew Jackson and other Jacksonian presidents.157  Curtis 
remained committed to this distinction between broad federal 
power and limited executive power during the 1860s.  On 
questions of national power, or at least national powers granted 
by the Constitution of 1789, Curtis remained an orthodox Whig.  
He condemned Lincoln for performing solos, but supported the 
Legal Tender Acts passed by Congress.  Curtis defended 
congressional power to declare paper money legal tender before 
the Supreme Court, a defense that relied heavily on the principles 
underlying McCulloch v. Maryland.158 
John McLean.  Justice McLean was a committed 
“Madisonian Whig.”159  McLean claimed “he had never voted an 
anti-Whig ticket,” and that “[n]o person in the [United States] 
desires more ardently than I do, the ascendency of Whig 
principles generally.”160  Paul Finkelman notes that McLean “[a]t 
various times in his career . . . was considered a National 
Republican, a Jacksonian Democrat, an Anti-Mason, a Free 
Democrat, a Whig, a Free Soiler, a Know-Nothing, . . . and a 
Republican,” but during his time on the Supreme Court he “was 
156. Id. at 306-35. 
157. See DANIEL WALKER HOWE, THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF THE AMERICAN
WHIGS 87-92 (1979); HOLT, supra note 4, at 28-30. 
158. See STREICHLER, supra note 150, at 294; Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. 603, 606 
(1869); id. at 629-30 (Miller, J., dissenting). 
159. VERITAS, A SKETCH OF THE LIFE OF JOHN MCLEAN OF OHIO 15 (1846); id. at 6-
7, 9. 
160.  FRANCIS P. WEISENBURGER, THE LIFE OF JOHN MCLEAN: A POLITICIAN ON THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 110 (1937) (quoting John McLean to John Teesdale, 
December 17, 1846); BIBLIOTHECA SACRA, LETTERS OF JOHN MCLEAN TO JOHN TEESDALE 
720 (William Salter ed., October 1899); see WEISENBURGER, MCLEAN, supra note 162, at 
79-80 (noting that by 1832 McLean was an “anti-Jackson man”). 
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unalterably hostile to the Democratic Party.”161  McLean proved 
a strong supporter of American System proposals.  When in 
Congress during the 1810s, he was a devotee of internal 
improvements and protective tariffs, as well as a thorn in the side 
of John Randolph, the leader of the old Republicans in the House 
of Representatives.  An admiring biography declared that 
McLean “has always sustained the great Whig cause and 
measures—has supported a Revenue Tariff, shaped for the 
protection of Home Industry; a well regulated system of 
Currency; and uniformly opposed the Sub-treasury,” the banking 
system favored my many Jacksonian Democrats.162  Finkelman 
observes that McLean on the Taney Court “emerged as a 
moderate nationalist on commercial issues” who “kept alive the 
tradition of Marshall and Story that Congress and the Constitution 
were superior to the states.”163  Story regarded McLean as “a good 
and satisfactory appointment,” maintained “an intimate 
friendship” with him while they were on the bench, and “was 
warmly interested that [McLean] should become a candidate for 
the Presidency.”164 
McLean might have betrayed Whig commitments in the 
right circumstances, but Jacksonians hopes of gaining his vote 
diminished each decade McLean sat on the bench.  McLean’s 
attitude towards the national bank shifted earlier his career with 
his partisan allegiances.  When a National Republican in 1816 
McLean voted against the bank in Congress, but when his Whig 
commitments firmed up, McLean made clear he thought the 
constitutional issues had been settled by McCulloch.  He informed 
a correspondent, “[t]he question is undoubtedly settled as fully as 
it is possible to settle any question arising on the construction of 
the Constitution.”165  Given McLean’s constant hunger for the 
presidency, the possibility that he might have cast a vote against 
161. Finkelman, supra note 42, at 524, 531.
162.  VERITAS, supra note 159, at 15; id. at 7.  For specific Whig positions that McLean
endorsed, see WEISENBURGER, supra note 160, at 18, 33, 48-49, 75-76, 85, 108; 
BIBLIOTHECA SACRA, supra note 160, at 722. 
163. See Finkleman, supra note 42, at 538.
164. See 1 LIFE AND LETTERS, supra note 140, at 564 (quoting Joseph Story to
William Fettyplace, March 1829); See also 2 LIFE AND LETTERS, supra note 22, at 35; 
ROGER TANEY, supra note 2, at 431 (quoting Story to McLean, Oct. 9, 1843). 
165. BIBLIOTHECA SACRA, supra note 160, at 722.  For McLean’s waffling on the
bank issue, see id. at 721-22; WEISENBURGER, supra note 160, at 17, 93-95. 
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some aspect of the American System under the right conditions 
cannot be ruled out.166  Still, while McLean’s tendency to trim his 
principles means he might have voted to declare unconstitutional 
specific details of the American System, little doubt exists that his 
vote in most cases would have followed Justice Story. 
Joseph Story.  Joseph Story was the most certain vote on 
the Taney Court for sustaining exercises of national power.  Story 
was a member of the unanimous Court in McCulloch that declared 
constitutional federal power to incorporate a national bank.  
While purporting to be above partisan politics, Story admitted to 
voting a straight Whig ticket,167  frequently drafted legislation 
asserting national powers for Whigs to introduce in Congress,168  
and regarded the principles underlying McCulloch as of 
“fundamental importance to the existence of the government.”169  
He told McLean that “a national bank is indispensable for the true 
and permanent interests of the Union.”170  When the War of 1812 
ended, Story called on National Republicans to “extend the 
national authority over the whole extent of power given by the 
Constitution.”171  “Let us,” he declared, 
 have great military and naval schools; an adequate 
regular army; the broad foundations laid of a permanent 
navy; a national bank; a national system of bankruptcy; 
a great navigation act; a general survey of our ports, and 
appointments of port-wardens and pilots; Judicial 
Courts which shall embrace the whole constitutional 
166. See ROPER, supra note 86, at 104 (noting McLean’s willingness to “trim his
principles” when doing so might advance his political ambitions).  For McLean’s presidential 
ambitions, see Finkelman, supra note 42, at 519, 520, 525-33; Brickner, supra note 42, at 
193, 202-04. 
167. For Story’s allegiance to the Whig party, see 1 LIFE AND LETTERS, supra note
22, at 424, 426, 538, 540; ROGER TANEY, supra note 2, at 430 (quoting Story to Henry Clay, 
August 3, 1842 (“I am a Whig”)). 
168. For Story’s career as a legislative draftsperson on such matters as federal
common law, federal jurisdiction, admiralty and bankruptcy, see 1 LIFE AND LETTERS, supra 
note 140, at 234, 246, 315, 437, 439; 2 LIFE AND LETTERS, supra note 22, at 268, 271-72, 
292-96, 370-73, 402-08; TANEY PERIOD, supra note 1, at 43.  Story may have drafted the 
rendition procedures that were eventually incorporated into the Fugitive Save Act of 1850.  
See R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF THE 
OLD REPUBLIC 376-77 (1985). 
169. 1 LIFE AND LETTERS, supra note 140, at 326 (quoting Joseph Story to Sarah
Wetmore Story, March 17, 1819). 
170. TANEY PERIOD, supra note 1, at 114-15.
171. 1 LIFE AND LETTERS, supra note 140, at 254 (quoting Joseph Story to Nathaniel
Williams, February 22, 1815). 
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powers; national notaries; public and national justices 
of the peace, for the commercial and national concerns 
of the United States.172 
Whether Story endorsed New Deal and Great Society 
interpretations of McCulloch as sanctioning virtually any exercise 
of federal power that did not violate an individual right173  is 
doubtful.  Story and other antebellum jurists sympathetic to 
American system measures believed that most areas of economic 
life were reserved to the states.  Nineteenth century Whigs should 
not be confused with mid-twentieth century Democrats.174  Still, 
on all questions of federal power in which Whigs differed from 
Jacksonians, Story could be found firmly on the side of national 
power. 
172. Id.; see also id. at 270-71, 296, 484-85; 2 LIFE AND LETTERS, supra note 22, at 
82. 
173. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S.  641, 651 (1966); United States v. Darby,
311 U.S. 100, 118-19 (1941). 
174. See generally Howard Gillman, More on the Origins of the Fuller Court’s
Jurisprudence: Reexamining the Scope of Federal Power over Commerce and 
Manufacturing in Nineteenth-Century Constitutional Law, 49 POL. RES. Q. 415 (1996); 
Howard Gillman, The Struggle over Marshall and the Politics of Constitutional History, 47 
POL. RES. Q. 877 (1994). 
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III. THE SCORECARD
TABLE ONE: 
175.  Woodbury was given a recess appointment in 1845.  Levi Woodbury, 
BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Levi_Woodbury [https://perma.cc/X658-JTDN] (last 
visited February 26, 2019). 
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Daniel Daniel Daniel 
Taney Taney Taney 
Catron Catron Clifford 
Wayne Wayne Catron 
McKinley Campbell Wayne 
Nelson Nelson Campbell 
Grier Grier Nelson 
Curtis Curtis Grier 
McLean McLean McLean 
Table One lines up the justices in very rough order according 
to their political and constitutional opposition to the national bank 
and internal improvements for the purpose of determining who 
the median justice might have been had the Taney Court voted on 
the constitutionality of an American system proposal.  Justices 
who identified as Jacksonian Democrats are italicized.  The 
median justice is bolded.  The ordering, as noted above, is rough.  
The respect placements of Grier and Nelson is random, as are the 
respective placements of Catron and Wayne, Barbour and Daniel, 
and all the committed Whig justices. 
The lineups support Webster’s fear that the Supreme Court 
was likely to overrule McCulloch’s holding that Congress had the 
power to incorporate a national bank and more general concerns 
that the Jacksonians on the bench might move against other 
American system proposals.  With exception of the period 
between 1853 and 1858, from 1837 to 1860 the Taney Court 
majority consisted of justices who had previously been Jackson’s 
lieutenants in the bank wars.  McKinley, who Polk placed on a 
House Ways and Means Committee stacked to condemn the Bank 
of the United States, is the median justice for most of this time 
period.  Wayne, who led the fight in Congress against the national 
bank, is the other justice who occasionally appears in the coveted 
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five slot.  As important, given the possibility that some justices, 
McKinley and Campbell, in particular, might have been 
unreliable, Jacksonians from 1845 until 1860 enjoyed 
supermajorities on the Supreme Court.  In several years, eight of 
the nine justices on the Supreme Court were Jacksonian 
appointees whose Jacksonian constitutional commitments were 
repeatedly expressed or vouched for by leading politicians.  If, for 
example, Campbell at some point between 1853 and 1858 
revealed his alleged previously private Whig commitments, the 
Taney Court still would have held Congress had no power to 
incorporate a national bank or fund internal improvements in the 
states had either Nelson or Grier, who were considered orthodox 
Jacksonians by their contemporaries, remained true to the 
Jacksonian commitments that explain their appointments to the 
federal bench. 
The historical record belies the possibility that the Bank of 
the United States or federally funded internal improvements 
would have survived a test case because two or three of the 
committed Jacksonians on the bench were as committed to 
judicial restraint.  As noted above,176 most Jacksonian judicial 
appointments championed judicial power before joining the 
bench.  Six Jacksonians had no difficulty before the Civil War 
declaring that Congress had no power to ban slavery in the 
territories, a decision that required narrowly interpreting the 
constitutional meaning of “necessary.”177  The surviving 
Jacksonians on the Supreme Court had no difficulty imposing 
limits on federal economic power after the Civil War.178  If a 
Taney Court majority believed Congress had no power to 
incorporate a national bank or fund internal improvements in the 
states, this history suggests that in a proper case that majority 
would have declared that Congress had no power to incorporate a 
national bank or fund internal improvements in the states. 
IV. THE REASON WHY
McCulloch survived, or at least was not overruled, in 
Jacksonian American because, contrary to Tocqueville’s 
176. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
177. See supra Part II. 
178. See sources cited supra note 173.
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aphorism, “scarcely any political question [arose] in the United 
States” during the 30 years before the Civil War “that [was] . . . 
resolved . . . into a judicial question.”179  Many political questions 
during the Taney period were resolved into constitutional 
questions.  Each element of the American plan, the national bank, 
internal improvements, protective tariffs and the distribution of 
surplus funds, was discussed in constitutional terms by members 
of Congress and presidents.180  Nevertheless, the 
constitutionalization of controversies over the national bank and 
American plan did not lead to judicialization.  The Supreme Court 
as a whole did not speak decisively on the constitutionality of any 
American plan measure debated in Congress before Lincoln’s 
election.  Daniel was the only member of the tribunal who offered 
an opinion on internal improvements.181  The other justices 
ignored McCulloch, McCulloch’s claims about national powers, 
and the implications of McCulloch for other Whig programs.182  
The status of slavery in the territories and the means for 
recapturing fugitive slaves were the only two political questions 
that excited sustained national attention immediately before the 
Civil War that were resolved into judicial questions adjudicated 
by the Taney Court.  The other constitutional issues that the Taney 
Court adjudicated, while of importance to the parties and court 
watchers, attracted little national political attention.183 
The narrow construction of national power that Jacksonians 
in the executive and legislative branches of the national 
government championed partly explains why the Jacksonian 
majority on the Taney Court did not overrule or significantly 
narrow McCulloch.  The Supreme Court could revisit the 
constitutionality of the national bank or some other controversial 
exercise of national power only after the national government 
adopted or implemented some core element of the American plan.  
179. Alexis de Tocqueville, 1 Democracy in America., I THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL 
REVIEW 245 (Phillips Bradley ed., 1945). 
180. See Mark A. Graber, Resolving Political Questions into Judicial Questions:
Tocqueville’s Thesis Revisited, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 485, 534-35 (2005). 
181. See Searight v. Stokes, 44 U.S. 151, 180-81 (1845) (Daniel, J., dissenting).
182. See DAVID S. SCHWARTZ, THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION: JOHN MARSHALL 
AND THE 200-YEAR ODYSSEY OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 524 (2019) (forthcoming) 
(“By the early 1850s, the Taney Court had ignored McCulloch into oblivion, and reversed 
its thrust”). 
183. See Graber, supra note 179, at 525-29. 
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Whigs and Democrats agreed that the federal government had no 
constitutional obligation to incorporate a national bank or finance 
certain internal improvements. When the federal government 
failed to adopt those or other constitutionally controversial 
exercises of national power, the questions of constitutional law 
debated in Congress could not be resolved into a lawsuit.  A 
Supreme Court primed to overrule McCulloch was denied that 
opportunity when two national bank bills were vetoed by 
Jacksonian presidents, when Jacksonian presidents vetoed other 
American System bills, and when Congress rejected proposed 
exercises of national power.184 
The truncated agenda of the Taney Court also reflects the 
lack of support services for litigation in antebellum America. 
Many constitutional issues are resolved into judicial issues only 
when either government or private organizations provide victims 
of claimed constitutional wrongs with expert attorneys and other 
services necessary to initiate and maintain litigation.185  Such 
services were rarely available in Jacksonian America. Aggrieved 
antebellum Americans did not have access to an American Civil 
Liberties Union analogue, that might sponsor litigation aimed at 
expanding constitutional rights or a Pacific Legal Foundation 
analogue, that might sponsor litigation aimed at curbing federal 
powers.  This lack of support for constitutional litigation was 
184. See Andrew Jackson, Veto Message, in 3 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES
AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 197 (James D. Richardson ed., 1987) (no power to finance 
local improvements); id. at 28 (no power to establish a national bank); John Tyler, Veto 
Message, in 4 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 100-
113 (James D. Richardson ed.,1987) (no power to incorporate a bank); id. at 1021-23 (no 
power to improve navigation of rivers); James K. Polk, Veto Message, in 4 A COMPILATION 
OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 769-770 (James D. Richardson ed., 
1987) (no power to construct local improvements); id. at 775-776; Franklin Pierce, Veto 
Message, in 5 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 170-73 
(James D. Richardson ed., 1987) (no power to construct hospitals for the insane); id. at 207-
209 (no power to make local improvements); id. at 199-208 (no power to make internal 
improvements); James Buchanan, Veto Message, in 5 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES 
AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 355-56 (James D. Richardson ed., 1987) (no power over 
education); id. at 545-48 (no power to make local improvements); id. at 569-70 (no power 
to give public lands away to settlers). Congress failed to pass constitutionally controversial 
exercises of federal power when Zachary Taylor and Millard Fillmore, two Whigs, were 
president. 
185. See CHARLES R. EPP, EXTERNAL PRESSURE AND THE SUPREME COURT’S 
AGENDA 255, 260-61 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999); see generally 
SUSAN E. LAWRENCE, THE POOR IN COURT: THE LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM AND 
SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 11-12 (1990). 
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partly rooted in elite understandings that the point of litigation 
was to win. John C. Calhoun and other South Carolinians 
preferred nullification to litigation because they believed that the 
Marshall Courts would uphold the constitutionality of protective 
tariffs.186  Abolitionists were the only political activists in 
Jacksonian America who consistently provided support services 
for litigation and who were willing to litigate when the chances 
of success were limited.  Federal courts were able to resolve 
constitutional questions about federal power to pass fugitive slave 
acts and the status of slavery in the territories because 
abolitionists or other persons opposed to slavery represented 
persons of color free of charge or for nominal fees.187 
The way the Supreme Court resolved constitutional 
questions in slavery cases nevertheless casts doubt on whether 
Jacksonian vetoes and the absence of litigation support services 
fully explain why the Taney Court in the thirty years before the 
Civil War refrained from specifically ruling on federal power to 
incorporate a national bank, finance certain internal 
improvements, distribute government surpluses to the states or 
impose protective tariffs.  Taney Court majorities in both Prigg 
and Dred Scott engaged in far-ranging discussions that were not 
necessary to the result in the case.  Justices Story and Chief Justice 
Taney in Prigg debated at length whether states were obligated to 
help enforce the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793,188  even though the 
case could have been decided solely by declaring that 
slaveholders had a right to recaption independent of the Fugitive 
Slave Act of 1793 or that Pennsylvania’s liberty laws were 
inconsistent with federal law.189  Dred Scott could have been 
resolved as a choice of law case,190  with no need to consider 
either whether free persons of color might be citizens of the 
United States or the constitutional status of slavery in the 
186. See John C. Calhoun, Exposition Reported by the Special Committee, in THE
PAPERS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 447 (Clyde N. Wilson & W. Edwin Hemphill eds., 1977). 
187. See DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN
AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 252 (1978); Richard H. Sewell & Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free 
Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party Before the Civil War, 57 J. AM. 
HIST. 281-84 (1970). 
188. See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 613-21 (1842); id. at 626-36 (Taney,
C.J., concurring).
189. See Prigg, 41 U.S. 539 at 579, 589; id. at 626-27 (Taney, C.J., concurring).
190. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 457-69 (1856) (Nelson, J., concurring).
118 ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol.  72:1 
territories, or having decided that free persons of color had no 
power to sue in a federal court, Taney could have cut the 
discussion of congressional power to ban slavery in the west.191  
Given the Taney Court’s willingness to make “maximalist” 
decisions when slavery was on the table, questions remain as to 
why the Justices consistently made “minimalist” decisions when 
adjudicating cases concerned with other national powers.192 
Jacksonian commitments to partisan supremacy may better 
explain judicial silence on McCulloch and the constitutional 
status of the national bank during the thirty years before the Civil 
War.  Partisan supremacists believe constitutional questions are 
best settled by dominant political parties.193  Martin Van Buren 
articulated the fundamental premise of partisan supremacy when 
he claimed, “[i]f different interpretations are put upon the 
Constitution by the different departments, the people is the 
tribunal to settle the dispute. Each of the departments is the agent 
of the people, doing their business according to the powers 
conferred; and where there is a disagreement as to the extent of 
these powers, the people themselves, through the ballot-boxes, 
must settle it.”194  Andrew Jackson and Abraham Lincoln were 
dedicated to some version of partisan supremacy.195  The post-
Civil Amendments make sense only in light of Republican 
commitments to partisan supremacy.196  The Taney Court’s 
willingness to remain on the sidelines during the debates over 
American System proposals is another manifestation of 
nineteenth century commitments to having dominant political 
parties rather than courts per se resolve the most constitutionally 
controversial issues of the day. 
191. Id. at 427-28. 
192. On the difference between “maximalist” and “minimalist” decisions, see
generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE 
SUPREME COURT (1999). 
193. For discussions of partisan supremacy, see MARK A. GRABER, SEPARATION OF
POWERS 224, 235-42 (Karen Orren & John C. Compton eds., 2018) [hereinafter GRABER, 
Separation of Powers]; Mark A. Graber, Teaching the Forgotten Fourteenth Amendment and 
the Constitution of Memory, 62 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 639, 649-50 (2018) [hereinafter Forgotten 
Fourteenth Amendment]. 
194. MARTIN VAN BUREN, INQUIRY INTO THE ORIGIN AND COURSE OF POLITICAL
PARTIES IN THE UNITED STATES 330 (1867). 
195. See GRABER, Separation of Powers, supra note 192, at 237-39.
196. See Graber, Forgotten Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 192, at 650.
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Jacksonians from 1828 until 1860 consistently limited the 
judicial agenda by making self-conscious decisions not to resolve 
constitutional questions into judicial questions.  When, as was the 
case with internal improvements and Negro Seamen’s Acts, 
elected officials made clear that they preferred legislative and 
executive solutions to hotly contested constitutional question, the 
Supreme Court stayed out of the political fray.197  Congress 
prevented constitutional litigation over trade policy by steadfastly 
refusing to describe the duty on any good as a protective tariff.198  
The central legislative debate during the New Mexico/Texas 
boundary dispute was whether Congress should draw the 
boundary line or authorize a lawsuit that would require the 
Supreme Court to draw the boundary line. After much debate, the 
legislative option was chosen. No litigation followed even though 
the issue was theoretically justiciable.199 
Partisan supremacy differs from both legislative and 
executive supremacy.  No institution has any inherent right to 
settle constitutional issues.  Rather, the dominant party designates 
the proper forum for resolving particular constitutional 
controversies.  On matters Jacksonians were united, they 
preferred legislative and executive solutions.  Jackson maintained 
the election of 1832 established executive power to resolve the 
constitutional status of the national bank.200  On matters 
Jacksonians were divided, they preferred judicial solutions.  Dred 
Scott and Prigg were handed down only after the legislature 
whose laws were under constitutional attack initiated judicial 
policymaking.201  Legislative supremacy on American plan 
measures and judicial supremacy on slavery measures were 
derived from the more fundamental commitments to partisan 
supremacy. 
Jacksonians had no need for a judicial decision overruling 
McCulloch while they controlled the Senate, House or 
Presidency.  Jacksonian majorities could determine the 
197. See Searight v. Stokes, 44 U.S. 151, 158 (1845) (argument of Nelson, A.G.);
TANEY PERIOD, supra note 1, at 393-94. 
198. See Calhoun, supra note 185, at 447.
199. See ELBERT B. SMITH, THE PRESIDENCIES OF ZACHARY TAYLOR & MILLARD
FILLMORE 103, 173-74 (1988). 
200. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 186, at 206.
201. See TANEY PERIOD, supra note 1, at 538; FEHRENBACHER, supra note 186, at 
206.
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constitutional meaning of such phrases as “necessary and proper” 
and restrict the scope of implied powers by rejecting any measure 
Democrats thought inconsistent with a strict construction of the 
Constitution.  No need existed for the Supreme Court to limit 
government power that was already being limited by Congress or 
the White House.  No need existed for a Supreme Court decision 
resolving interparty squabbles over what internal improvements 
were and were not constitutionally permitted that Jacksonians 
were resolving in the elected branches of the national 
government.  Judicial dicta declaring that the federal government 
had no power to incorporate a national bank or sponsor internal 
improvements might have been inconvenient while Jacksonians 
reigned.  Jacksonians objected to the latitude of McCulloch, but 
not the concept of implied powers per se.202  They supported some 
exercises of national powers.  Many Jacksonians favored some 
internal improvements under certain conditions, with prominent 
Westerners being particularly enthusiastic.203  A Supreme Court 
decision made without the consent of Jacksonians from all 
regions of the United States might have embarrassed some 
proposed Jacksonian exercises of national power and truncated 
intraparty debates over the constitutionality of other exercises of 
national powers. 
Jacksonians were commitment to partisan supremacy only 
when Jacksonians had sufficient control of the elected branches 
of national government to prevent American system measures 
from becoming law.  Once Jacksonians lost control of the elected 
branches of government, the Jacksonian justices on the bench 
became raging judicial supremacists.204  Every former Democrat 
on the bench voted in 1869 and 1870 to declare that the federal 
government had no power to make paper money legal tender,205  
even though the general principles underlying McCulloch 
provided strong, probably convincing support for the Legal 
202. See David S. Schwartz, supra note 14, at 150-51, 158.
203. See Eric Foner, The Wilmot Proviso Revisited, 56 J. AM. HIST. 262 (1969).
204. See Mark A. Graber, The Jacksonian Origins of the Chase Court Activism, 25 J. 
SUP. CT. HIST. 17 (2000). 
205. Salmon Chase, Stephen Field, Nelson, Clifford, and Grier were in the majority
in Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. 603 (1969).  Chase, Nelson, Clifford, and Field dissented 
in the Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457 (1870).  Chase and Field, while appointed by 
Republican presidents, were Democrats before joining the bench.  See Graber, The 
Jacksonian Origins, supra note 203, at 18. 
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Tender Acts.206  If the surviving Jacksonians were willing to 
exercise judicial power to strike down aggressive exercises of 
national power by a Republican controlled government, little 
reason exists for thinking those justices would have been more 
restrained when adjudicating aggressive exercises of national 
power by a Whig controlled government.  Had William Henry 
Harrison lived and fulfilled his inaugural promise from refraining 
from using the presidential veto except in exceptionally rare 
circumstances,207  McCulloch, at least the McCulloch that 
authorized the national government to incorporate a national 
bank, would most likely not have survived the 1840s. 
V. TEACHING MCCULLOCH IN 1858 AND 2019
The high probability that McCulloch’s holding on 
congressional power to incorporate a national bank would have 
been overruled had the Supreme Court been given the opportunity 
in a proper case raises questions about how to teach constitutional 
law in periods of regime change.  Constitutional pedagogy is 
simple when regime change takes the form of constitutional 
amendments or decisions that overrule decisions stating central 
commitments of the previous regime.  The post-Civil War 
amendments relegated Dred Scott and Prigg to classes on 
constitutional history or constitutional theory, the small portion 
of a constitutional law class dedicated to constitutional history or 
constitutional theory or perhaps to a constitutional law class 
devoted to the use of anti-canonical cases in constitutional 
argument.208  The New Deal Constitutional Revolution had the 
same impact on such judicially overruled cases as Carter v. 
Carter Coal Company209  and Hammer v. Dagenhart.210  Had the 
Supreme Court in 1845 declared the federal government had no 
206. Hepburn, 75 U.S. at 629-31 (Miller, J., dissenting); Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 
at 537-39. 
207. William Henry Harrison, Inaugural Address, in 4 A COMPILATION OF THE
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897 1, 10-11 (James D. Richardson ed., 
1897). 
208. See Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379 (2011).
209. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
210. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
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power to incorporate a national bank, no constitutional law class 
in 1858 would have taught McCulloch as good law and no 
hypothetical bar examination in 1858 would have marked as a 
correct assertions that a Third Bank of the United States was a 
constitutionally appropriate exercise of federal power. 
Constitutional pedagogy is more complicated when regime 
change takes the form of constitutional practices that ignore 
decisions stating the central commitments of the past regime.  In 
such instances, the legal status of those past regime commitments 
is ambiguous.  They remain technically good law.  Nevertheless, 
the decisions stating those commitments have no impact on actual 
constitutional practice.  While stating the holding of McCulloch 
might have been the right answer to an 1858 bar examination 
question on federal power to incorporate the national bank, that 
citation had no persuasive force in constitutional controversies 
adjudicated by the Taney Court or by Jacksonian presidents.  
Constitutional law professors in these circumstances must decide 
whether to teach the landmark decisions of a previous regime 
until they are overruled or teach the precedents, principles and 
processes that actually guide constitutional decision making in 
their present. 
Teach McCulloch until overruled.  Chief Justice Salmon 
Chase in Hepburn v. Griswold provided the foundations for 
teaching McCulloch in 1858 when he declared that McCulloch 
after 1819 was “accepted as a correct exposition of the 
Constitution.”211  Jacksonians did not “accept” McCulloch in the 
sense that the decision was a precedent that guided constitutional 
decision making.  The Taney Court never cited McCulloch as a 
precedent for implied federal powers or as a precedent for federal 
power to incorporate a national bank.  McCulloch was “accepted” 
in Jacksonian American only in the sense that the decision had 
not been formally overruled by constitutional amendment or 
judicial decree.  Presenting McCulloch as good law in 1858 taught 
future practitioners that the case remained a living precedent that 
could be revived without further ceremony.  Decisions that are 
explicitly reversed by constitutional amendment or judicial 
decision can be revived only by a contrary constitutional 
amendment or another judicial decision overruling the initial 
211. 75 U.S. 603, 614 (1869). 
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overruling.  Neither was necessary to reinvigorate McCulloch’s 
understanding of implied powers or any other case that has merely 
been ignored by constitutional decision makers for long periods 
of time.212  All that was necessary for the federal government to 
incorporate a national bank in 1858 was more persuasive 
arguments or more persuadable judges. 
Teach McCulloch and the Cases Narrowing McCulloch.  
David Schwartz in his wonderful forthcoming book provides the 
foundations for teaching McCulloch and the Taney Court cases 
discussing implied powers.213  Schwartz points out that the 
Supreme Court from 1837 until 1860 never repudiated 
McCulloch’s holding that the federal government had the power 
to incorporate a national bank or the general principles underlying 
the implied powers of the federal government.  Instead, in a series 
of opinions that never mentioned McCulloch, the justices adopted 
narrower understandings of implied federal power and broader 
understandings of reserved state powers.  Students training to be 
practicing attorneys in 1858 should have known McCulloch 
because attorneys may cite as good law any case that has not been 
explicitly overruled.  They should have known such Taney Court 
cases as United States v. Marigold214  and United States v. 
Coombs215  because those were the precedents that federal courts 
would likely rely on when determining the scope of federal 
powers. 
Teach McCulloch and the Bank Veto.  What Schwartz 
describes as the “revisionist” account of Jackson’s bank veto216  
provides the foundation for teaching both McCulloch and the 
Bank Veto.  On this account, Jackson was not challenging the 
judicial decision to sustain a federal law incorporating a national 
bank, but merely determining whether to exercise powers the 
Supreme Court had acknowledged were vested in election 
officials.217  Practicing attorneys in 1858 needed to know 
212. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (reviving McPherson v. Blacker, 146 
U.S. 1 (1892) after 108 years). 
213. The first three sentences of this paragraph summarize SCHWARTZ, THE SPIRIT 
OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 181. 
214. 50 U.S. 560 (1850).
215. 37 U.S. 72 (1837).
216. Schwartz, Defying McCulloch, supra note 14, at 131. 
217. See G. Edward White, The Constitutional Journey of Marbury v. Madison, 89
VA. L. REV. 1463, 1496-97 (2001). 
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McCulloch’s analysis of implied powers because Marshall’s 
opinion remained the official law of the land in Jacksonian 
America with respect to the judiciary’s exposition of 
constitutional law.  They needed to know Jackson’s veto of the 
bank bill because that was the constitutional precedent that guided 
the elected branches of the national government.  Professors by 
juxtaposing McCulloch and the bank veto could teach students 
preparing to become practicing attorneys three important features 
of Jacksonian and American constitutionalism. First, in 
Jacksonian America, presidents exercised independent 
constitutional authority and did not defer to Supreme Court 
decisions broadly interpreting federal power and narrowly 
interpreting the reserved rights of the states.  Second, elected 
officials in the United States at all times have the power to refrain 
from exercising what the Supreme Court has ruled to be their 
constitutional powers and elected officials may refrain because 
they believe the Supreme Court has too broadly interpreted their 
constitutional powers.  Third, when Jacksonian presidents are 
exercising independent constitutional authority or when any 
government official is claiming constitutional grounds for 
refraining from exercising what judicial precedent regards as 
constitutional powers, the constitution in and outside of the courts 
diverges.  Students preparing to be practicing attorneys in 1858 
should know that while McCulloch governed what federal powers 
federal courts would sustain, the Bank Veto governed federal 
power the elected branches of government would exercise. 
Do Not Teach McCulloch.  Abraham Lincoln provided 
foundations for not teaching McCulloch at all in 1858 when in his 
sixth debate with Stephen Douglas he declared, “[d]id not he and 
his political friends find a way to reverse the decision of that 
[Supreme] Court in favor of the constitutionality of the National 
Bank?”218  Teaching McCulloch’s discussion of implied powers 
as good constitutional law in 1858, from this perspective, made 
no more pedagogical sense than presently teaching as good 
constitutional law Dred Scott, the judicial decision in Pollock v. 
Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co.219  declaring the income tax 
218. Abraham Lincoln, Sixth Debate with Stephen A. Douglas, at Quincy, Illinois, in
3 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 1, 278 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953). 
219. 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
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unconstitutional or Plessy v. Ferguson.220  Constitutional lawyers 
concerned only with persuading Supreme Court justices and other 
constitutional decision makers had no need to be taught 
McCulloch in 1858 because that decision was unlikely to be cited 
by any court or constitutional decision maker for any 
constitutional proposition, was explicitly repudiated by the party 
presently controlling the exercise of federal powers and was 
likely to be overruled should the occasion arise.  McCulloch was 
relevant to the practice ready lawyer in the years immediately 
before the Civil War only to the extent such an attorney could use 
some knowledge of constitutional history and theory, or as an 
example of how lawyers sometimes manipulate anti-canonical 
cases to persuade judicial tribunals.221 
Future Teaching.  The United States appears to be 
experiencing a regime change at least as significant as the regime 
change that took place at the onset of the Jacksonian Era,222  but 
the nature and direction of that regime change is yet to be fully 
determined.  On one possible future, the Trump/McConnell 
regime will consolidate, regain control of the House of 
Representatives and implement a very conservative constitutional 
vision.  On another possible future, the 2018 national election will 
be the dawn of a new progressive era in which liberal Democrats 
gain control of all the branches of the national government and 
implement their constitutional vision.  Constitutional decision 
makers in these new regimes may mark the new political order 
with constitutional amendments and constitutional decisions 
explicitly overruling those decisions embodying the central 
constitutional commitments of the rival regime.  They might also 
follow the Jacksonian model and simply narrow or ignore 
particular constitutional landmarks of the past. 
Jacksonian paths are open to political activists on the left and 
right.  Americans in the near future might experience a 
conservative regime in which Roe v. Wade223  is never overruled, 
but judicial decisions permit states to regulate abortion in ways 
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that make terminating a pregnancy as difficult as was the case 
before 1973.  In this regime, commerce clause precedents from 
the New Deal remain good law in theory, but few if any federal 
statutes remain on the books that regulate transactions that take 
place entirely within a single state.  Presidents routinely veto for 
constitutional reasons legislation attempting such exercises of 
federal power on the ground that the commerce clause does not 
permit the federal government to regulate transactions that take 
place within a single state or because the impact on interstate 
commerce is not sufficiently substantial to warrant federal 
regulation.  Alternatively, Americans in the near future might 
experience a progressive regime in which District of Columbia v. 
Heller224  is never overruled, but courts routinely sustain all gun 
control regulations.  In this regime, precedents declaring 
constitutional the imposition of capital punishment remain good 
law in theory, but no murderer is ever executed.  The president 
and state governors in the few jurisdictions whose law permits 
executions routinely commute all death sentences on the ground 
that they believe capital punishment violates the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments or because the crime in question is not 
sufficient heinous to merit the ultimate sanction. 
Constitutional law professors in these regimes will have to 
ponder pedagogical issues analogous to those they might have 
considered had they been teaching in 1858. They might teach Roe, 
Wickard v. Filburn,225  Heller, and Gregg v. Georgia226  as good 
constitutional law until those cases are explicitly reversed by 
judicial decision or constitutional amendment.  They might offer 
their students a more refined view of constitutional law by 
combining Roe or Heller with the most recent judicial decision 
sustaining remarkably burdensome abortion or gun control 
regulations.  They might emphasize the difference between the 
constitution in and outside of courts by combining Wickard or 
Gregg with a presidential veto on constitutional grounds of a bill 
regulating intrastate commerce or a gubernatorial commutation 
on constitutional grounds of a death sentence.  Finally, 
constitutional law professors might communicate that a practice 
ready attorney in these regimes need not know Roe, Wickard, 
224. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
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Heller, and Gregg by ignoring those cases, confining them to 
history or theory courses or confining them to the history and 
theory section of their constitutional law course. 
